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Libya received clandestine nuclear shipments as late as March: IAEA
VIENNA (AFP) May 29, 2004
Turkey is now seen as a source of centrifuge parts shipped to Libya's nuclear weapons program, diplomats said Saturday, after revelations that Tripoli had received new clandestine shipments of equipment as late as this March.

Libya agreed in December 2003 to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs but last March a container of components for sophisticated L-2 centrifuges capable of enriching uranium up to bomb-grade levels arrived by boat in Libya, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in a confidential report.

The container had "escaped the attention" of the US-led teams which had seized five containers of centrifuge parts from "the cargo ship BBC China in October 2003," the IAEA said, according to a copy of the report obtained by

The IAEA is to further investigate Libya's program to develop nuclear weapons as questions linger about international smuggling and uranium contamination, according to the report, which was released to diplomats in Vienna on Friday.

A senior diplomat close to the IAEA told AFP the agency was investigating parts that had been manufactured in Turkey and that this might be the shipment that had arrived in March.

"Turkey has been a site where parts have been manufactured," the diplomat said, stressing that this was believed to be private and not connected to the government.

The diplomat confirmed a report in The Washington Post Saturday, which was sourced to US intelligence officials, that an important quantity of nuclear equipment secretly purchased by Libya appears to be missing.

The diplomat said the IAEA was "still looking and knows it should have more equipment" in hand based on what Libya has said.

He said equipment "could still be in manufacturers' workshops" or even be en route somewhere.

Libya, along with Iran and North Korea, was clandestinely supplied nuclear technology and parts by the international smuggling network run by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, the man considered the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb.

Khan built an elaborate international network for manufacturing, assembling and shipping atomic equipment, especially parts for high-technology centrifuges, the instrument for making the highly enriched uranium (HEU) used in atom bombs.

Khan's network had a manufacturing firm in Malaysia and used the United Arab Emirates as a shipping point.

Diplomats in Vienna named Turkey as both an assembly and manufacturing point, and said the UAE was also used for assembly of parts.

One diplomat said details were emerging slowly since the Libyans "had for more than 20 years run their nuclear program in secrecy and now all of a sudden they have to talk to foreigners. It's like a change of regime."

The Washington Post said US officials felt the Libyans wanted to prepare the Americans for the possibility that more illicit nuclear shipments could suddenly appear on Tripoli's docks.

The report is to be submitted to a meeting of the 35-nation IAEA board of governors that opens in Vienna on June 14 and at which ElBaradei had said in February that he hoped to close the Libyan dossier.

The IAEA, the UN organization that verifies adherence to non-proliferation safeguards, has been overseeing Libya's disarmament, which Tripoli agreed to last December 19 with the United States and Britain.

US officials have evacuated tons of sensitive equipment and materials to the United States.

IAEA inspectors have found contamination from highly enriched uranium as well as low enriched uranium on gas centrifuge equipment in Libya, the report said.

This is similar to HEU contamination that has been found in Iran on centrifuge parts.

Non-proliferation expert Gary Samore told AFP from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London that in Libya this was almost certainly from "contaminated parts bought from Pakistan."

But as Iran wants to maintain its uranium enrichment capability, investigators are wondering if the HEU particles found there are signs of Iranian-done enrichment rather than contamination from clandestine imports.

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