Iran has also provided "changing or contradictory information" on its work involving sophisticated P-2 centrifuges which can enrich uranium to bomb-grade levels, according to a confidential report by International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei, which was obtained by AFP.

Iran must must clear up these questions about uranium contamination and centrifuges if the international community is to believe Iran's claims its nuclear program is strictly peaceful, the IAEA said ahead of a June 14 meeting of its 35-nation board of governors.

"Bringing the two issues . . . to a close, after almost two years from when Iran's undeclared (nuclear) program came to the (IAEA's) knowledge, is of key importance to the agency's ability to provide the international community with the required assurances about Iran's nuclear activities," the IAEA said.

The United States says Iran is hiding a program to build the bomb and has called for the IAEA, which has been investigating the Iranian program since February 2003 after being alerted to it in August 2002, to refer the Islamic Republic to the UN Security Council for possible international sanctions.

But ElBaradei told a NATO meeting in Bratislava Tuesday "the jury is still out" on Iran's nuclear program, although he would not hesitate to recommend taking Tehran to the UN Security Council if a military link were found.

"We will not hesitate to report to the (agency's) board, which will report in its turn to the Security Council, if we see any connection with a military program," ElBaradei said.

But he said "there is no evidence that the Iranian program has some military dimension."

Diplomats said the IAEA will not be able to reach a decision on Iran in June since Tehran has delayed inspections and only last month submitted a report on its program which the agency will need months to evaluate.

The contamination by 36 percent U-235 was at a site in Farayand, following on such contamination already found at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran and the Natanz pilot enrichment plant, the IAEA report said.

A diplomat close to the IAEA said the agency now felt it could not verify that the contamination was, as Iran insists, from contaminated equipment bought in Pakistan and not from Iranian attempts to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU).

HEU can be fuel for civilian reactors or the basic material for an atomic bomb.

Meanwhile, three workshops in Iran are continuing to produce centrifuge components despite Tehran's claiming to have suspended uranium enrichment and related activities, the report said.

Iran had stated that it had suspended production of centrifuge components as of April 9 as a confidence-building measure with the IAEA, and the international community.

The IAEA "has been able to confirm this at three workshops but three workshops belonging to private companies have continued production," according to the report.

The IAEA said the workshops claimed they had not been given compensation for stopping production.

It also said Iran has now admitted to importing "some" magnets for sophisticated P-2 centrifuges, despite having previously said it had not obtained any P-2 centrifuges or parts from abroad, having made these domestically.

The IAEA said Iran has admitted to having inquired to buy 4,000 magnets for P-2 centrifuges, enough for 2,000 centrifuges, although it had not bought any.

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