One former intelligence official with detailed knowledge of the practice pre-Sept. 11 told United Press International that decisions about who should be handed over were sometimes made by junior officials and that, in certain cases, the CIA neither sought nor received assurances that suspected terrorists would not be tortured.

Other former and serving officials said that although both the authorities and the frequency of the practice have been dramatically expanded since Sept. 11, 2001, CIA rendition dates to 1986 and the establishment under President Reagan of the agency's Counterterrorist Center.

"It was a fairly routine practice," said Jeffrey Smith, who was general counsel to the CIA 1995-96.

The practice has recently become the subject of controversy, with allegations from human-rights groups and some Democratic lawmakers that the United States is deliberately sending suspected terrorists to countries where they will be tortured. Administration officials deny the charge.

"We neither use nor condone torture," a CIA official authorized to speak for the agency told United Press International Monday. The official, like others in the administration, declined further comment.

But the United States was not always so coy about the practice.

On Feb. 2, 2000, CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that "working with foreign governments worldwide, we have helped to render more than two dozen terrorists to justice" since July 1998. More than half, he added, were members of al-Qaida.

"These renditions have shattered terrorist cells and networks, thwarted terrorist plans, and in some cases even prevented attacks from occurring," Tenet boasted.

Though he did not say so, it is clear that the majority of those he was speaking about were sent to Egypt or Jordan, where - for suspected terrorists at least - torture was commonplace.

The former intelligence official called the pre-Sept. 11 rendition process "very informal."

"Say someone was wanted in country A. He could be arrested in country B for some minor immigration or criminal violation, or picked up in transit," the former official said.

In order to avoid what the former official called "the enormously cumbersome and sometimes impossible process" of extradition, US personnel would simply deliver the suspect to the country where he was wanted.

"Generally, (the suspect) would be handed over (by law enforcement or intelligence officials of country B) on the tarmac, at the end of the runway, at night, and then flown to country A."

The former official said that, where there were charges against the suspect, or a warrant for their arrest, no assurance about treatment from the country he was delivered to was required.

"The only requirement was that there be some kind of legal process (to which the rendered person would be subject) in country B."

The former official also said that decisions about who to render were sometimes taken at a low level, without consultation with the White House or other agencies.

"This fell squarely under the long-standing authorities for covert action we had under the Reagan finding (that established the CIA Counterterrorist Center in May 1986)."

Exceptions to this rule, the former official said, were cases where individuals were rendered back to the United States for prosecution, operations where US personnel might be hurt or killed, or if there was a danger that the US role might be exposed.

Other former officials said that much more extensive consultation was carried out with White House and Justice Department officials.

"It was a principal-level decision," said one former White House official, referring to the Cabinet-rank members of the National Security Council: the attorney general, the national security adviser and the secretary of state.

Smith said that the CIA looked at every operation "on a case-by-case basis and dealt with (it) at the appropriate level."

He said that where the role of US personnel was "more limited," decisions could be taken at a lower level "depending on the judgment of those involved."

Several of the officials who spoke to UPI were adamant that assurances were always sought about the treatment of those being rendered.

But the former intelligence official insisted that this was only done where the rendition was for the purposes of interrogation or intelligence-gathering, rather than for prosecution or law enforcement.

"We were just a taxi service," the former official said. "We were just delivering that person to a criminal-justice process."

Smith maintains that the United States would never knowingly have aided or abetted in torture. "We always took into account the question, 'How will this person be treated?'" he said.

One current US official told UPI that "the nature of this tool has changed" since Sept. 11. The new authorities were granted in a highly classified presidential memorandum signed by President Bush on Sept. 17, 2001.

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