"Our training audience is typically on their way to Iraq for the third time," said Cone, a Manchester, N.H., native and 1979 West Point graduate. "Our customers want to train here to attack the network - we can't give them the basics and expect them to learn the rest in theater."

The Joint IED Defeat Organization, known as JIEDDO, is attacking the IED threat using a balance of intelligence, training and technology. Originally formed as the Army's IED Task Force, the group has transformed into a combined joint service, interagency, multi-national program designed to leverage all available resources and technologies in a coordinated campaign to defeat the IED threat, according to the organization's mission statement.

JIEDDO officials have set up four training centers, known as Joint Centers of Excellence, one for each branch of service. The centers ensure troops have a chance to train before deployment with the equipment they will use in the IED fight and in conditions that more closely mirror theater situations, JIEDDO officials said. Training centers are located on the Marine base in Twentynine Palms, Calif., a Navy facility in Indian Head, Md., Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, and the Army's Fort Irwin, Calif.

JIEDDO hosted an IED Defeat Seminar last week at the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin. The four-day seminar was designed to identify gaps in counter-IED training as well as make participants aware of training JIEDDO now provides for units heading to Iraq and Afghanistan.

In his opening remarks at the seminar, Cone emphasized three important counter-IED training issues and encouraged the audience to make the training more of a priority in pre-deployment work-ups. He spoke of the need for better integration of technology onto the battlefield, the need to increase home station training and the importance of tailoring all counter-IED training to fit the audience.

Cone asked the leaders and trainers to start evaluating where changes can be made in home-station training. Then, shifting from training to communicating, he challenged leaders to share information at home and while forward deployed.

"We are a community of practice," he said. "If you're not participating in these VTCs (video teleconferences) we have, then you're a day late and a dollar short."

He said a breakdown in communication and information sharing is the leaders' fault and the troops lose as a result.

"We need to share information and ideas," Cone said. "Shame on us if we're doing something here at NTC that they're not doing at the Joint Readiness Training Center (on Fort Polk, La.)"

Switching back to training, Cone addressed JIEDDO's role in home-station training. He reminded leaders to take advantage of JIEDDO and the training centers' resources all the while recognizing their own responsibilities.

"We need to take an appetite suppressant when we talk of what JIEDDO can do for us," he said. "JIEDDO is a great asset, but ultimately, the responsibility of training soldiers and Marines lies with the commander."

Opening a two-hour panel discussion, Army Brig. Gen. Joe E. Ramirez Jr., deputy commanding general, Combined Arms Training Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, likened the IED fight to a game of chess.

"For every move we make, the enemy makes three," said Ramirez, a Houston native. "Multi-National Corp Iraq told me the enemy changes Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTP) every two to three weeks."

Ramirez, who served as deputy chief of staff for U.S. Central Command before being stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, echoed Cone's thoughts on information sharing.

"You can't rely on the last time you were there," he stressed to the audience. "If you haven't been to theater in the last four months-you're not up to date. Our biggest task is staying current and relevant."

Ramirez reminded the leaders and trainers of bi-monthly virtual teleconferences available to units all around the world. He said the feedback he receives from theater relates specifically to training and TTPs.

He urged the leaders and trainers at the seminar to place more emphasis on battle staff training.

"They need to address defeating not only the IEDs, but the network, the bomb maker and the financier," he said. "We need to assess how we train our battle staff."

Ramirez emphasized home station training needs to be more of a priority for reserve and active-duty units. He suggested changing the mobilization process to allow for pre-deployment training.

"The tip of the spear is absolutely the priority," said Ramirez, using a moniker commonly applied to forward deployed units. "We need to work harder to prepare them here to be the tip of the spear over there."

Another panel member, Marine Col. Niel E. Nelson, commanding officer of the Marine Corps' Engineer School located on Camp Lejeune, N.C., spoke of the importance of training troops at entry-level service schools.

"It's easier to form a habit than break one," Nelson said. "We get the kids right out of boot camp and the young lieutenants straight from The Basic School-and start teaching counter-IED techniques right then."

Nelson said instructors at the Marine Corps Engineer School teach that every movement is a route clearance movement.

"Teach that early enough," the 1984 graduate of San Diego State University said, "and they'll take it to theater with them whenever they deploy."

Nelson encouraged units across the Corps to conduct counter-IED training prior to attending Mojave Viper, the Marine Corps' premiere, live-fire pre-deployment training in Twentynine Palms, Calf.

Nelson's closing statement was met with a volley of "hooahs" from the Army, "oorahs" from the Marines and a scattering of applause from the audience.

"This isn't a Marine Corps thing or an Army thing," said the Bethpage, N.Y. native. "We might have different words and different uniforms, but we have the same mission - keep people alive, keep them aware and keep them going forward."

Benchmarks: Grim May for U.S. casualties
by Martin Sieff
Washington (UPI) May 23 - The news on U.S. casualties in Iraq was bad in April, but it got worse in May. As of Wednesday, May 23, 3,424 U.S. troops had been killed in Iraq since the start of military operations to topple Saddam Hussein on March 19, 2003. Of these, 2,801 were killed in action, according to official figures issued by the U.S. Department of Defense.

In all, 82 U.S. soldiers were killed in the 23-day period from May 1 through May 23 -- an average rate of just over 3.5 per day. This was a more than 25 percent rise on the death rate during the previous 12-day period from April 19 through April 30 when 33 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of 2.75 per day.

The latest figures for more than two-thirds of the month of May were also significantly worse than the 28-day period from March 22 to April 18 when 87 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of just over 3.1 per day. They were also more than 16 percent worse than the 22-day period from Feb. 28 to March 21, when 67 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of just over three per day.

The latest rates show that the "surge" strategy, while it has succeeded in suppressing much of the random killing by sectarian militias in Baghdad that preceded it, has clearly left U.S. troops in the Iraqi capital more exposed and vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Some 79 U.S. soldiers were killed in the 27-day period from Feb. 1 to Feb. 27 -- an average rate of just over 2.93 per day. Those figures were almost identical to the previous 27-day period when 78 U.S. troops were killed from Jan. 4 to Jan. 31 at an average rate of 2.81 per day.

The latest figures are also worse than the fatality rate of 3.4 killed per day during the 29-day period from Dec. 7 to Jan. 4, when 99 U.S. soldiers died in Iraq. They are more than 60 percent worse than the death rate during the 16-day period from Nov. 21 to Dec. 6, when 35 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of just over 2.2 per day.

The latest figures are also worse than those for the 14-day period from Nov. 7 to Nov. 20, when 32 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of just below 2.3 per day. And they are even worse than the 22-day period from Oct. 16 to Nov. 6, when 371 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of just below 3.23 per day.

During the 18-day period from Sept. 28 to Oct. 15, 56 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of just over 3.1 per day. That rate was identical to the one we reported Oct. 1 in these columns for the nine days from Sept. 19 to Sept. 27, when 28 U.S. soldiers were killed at an average rate of 3.1 per day. At that time, we noted that these figures were far higher than the rate during the previous 18-day period, when 33 U.S. soldiers were killed from Sept. 1 to Sept. 18, at an average rate of 1.77 per day. Those Sept. 19 to Oct. 15 figures were almost identical to the average rate per day of the past 50 days.

The current death rate of U.S. troops in Iraq is therefore worse for a sustained period of time than it has been for any comparable three-week period in at least the past two years.

As of Wednesday, 25,549 U.S. soldiers had been injured in Iraq since the start of military operations to topple Saddam. During the 23 days from May 1 through May 23, 637 U.S. soldiers were injured at an average rate of 27.7 per day.

This grim level rate of casualties suffered was more than twice as bad as during the previous 12 days from April 19 through April 30 when 148 U.S. troops were wounded at an average rate of 12.33 per day. And it was three times as bad as the 28-day period from March 22 through April 18 when 254 U.S. soldiers were injured at a rate of just over nine per day.

The latest figures were even worse than the rate of 23.2 wounded per day during the 22-day period from Feb. 28 to March 21. And they were more than 50 percent worse than the 27-day period from Feb. 1 to Feb. 27, when 398 U.S. soldiers were injured at an average rate of 16.9 per day. That figure was only marginally below the figures for the previous 27-day period from Jan. 4 to Jan. 31, when 465 U.S. soldiers were injured at an average rate of 17.2 per day.

From Oct. 16 to Nov. 6, 524 U.S. soldiers were injured in Iraq at an average rate of 23.81 per day. That rate of casualties suffered was virtually identical to the previous 18-day period from Sept. 28 to Oct. 15, when 427 U.S. soldiers were injured in Iraq at an average rate of 23.72 per day.

Those figures appeared particularly bad at the time, but they turned out to be only a short-term spike. However, the latest heavy level of casualty figures appear to reflect the continued increased exposure of U.S. forces made necessary by the "surge" strategy, coupled with the inability of the increased U.S. forces to inflict significant attrition on the Sunni insurgents who continue to target them.

The clear implication is that these increased rates of casualties may continue for some time.

(Jennie Haskamp is a writer for Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization.)

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