Gingrich may not necessarily be wrong when he points out parallels between the storms gathering today and those that preceded the first two world wars. Nevertheless, the confrontational, fatalistic mindset that this analogy is bound to produce in Americans should be avoided at all costs.

The better analogy is that the Middle East is embroiled in an Islamic civil war that is approaching its climactic stages. The parties to this civil war, which is outwardly visible only in fits and starts -- from Morocco to Afghanistan -- but has persisted underground for decades, are fighting for the right to define and govern Muslim societies.

The increasing boldness with which opportunistic actors around the world (in places such as North Korea, Sudan and Venezuela) challenge U.S. interests with impunity is directly related to the diminution of the United States' influence, caused by its precarious gamble on the political fate of the Middle East. Although problems for the United States in other regions are not entirely peripheral, they are largely connected to the outcome of the Islamic civil war.

The recent violence in Lebanon and Israel is so noteworthy because it involves every major state and faction with a stake in the Islamic civil war. More significant still is how the political fault lines forming in response to this latest round of fighting are beginning to crystallize, pitting non-state militants who embrace religious extremism (Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, al-Qaida) against autocratic states friendly with the West (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states).

The hardening of fault lines favors the extremists over the pro-Western autocrats because the broader Muslim population, lacking moderate alternatives, will invariably choose the side untainted by ties with outsiders. Strikingly, extremism is now starting to transcend Sunni-Shiite divisions previously thought unbridgeable. Hamas and Hezbollah (whether directly or indirectly) have coordinated the timing of raids to kidnap Israeli soldiers, and al-Qaida's leaders have issued calls for its adherents to support Hezbollah.

A decade ago, with authoritarian regimes firmly ensconced throughout the Middle East, extremist movements were languishing in their provincial hubs, unable to capture the imagination of the broader Muslim public.

Slogans such as "Islam is the solution" did not appeal to the disaffected youths they targeted, because such slogans lacked a compelling presentation of how the extremists' version of Islam could empower people. Iran's example demonstrated that the reality of rule under theocrats was no more likely to be utopian or prosperous than in Mubarak's Egypt.

And then came Osama bin Laden's idea. Go directly after the external powers that support the autocratic regimes, instead of the regimes themselves. This accomplished two things.

First, the terrorist attacks produced unprecedented images of power -- explosions followed by aftermath scenes of scared, disoriented Westerners unaccustomed to being on the receiving end of violence -- that dramatically portrayed the extremists as men of action and consequence, differentiating them from the status quo in the eyes of the masses. Second, retaliatory responses from the United States appealed to Muslims' inclination to close ranks against outsiders.

The United States failed to perceive that bin Laden was dragging it into the Islamic civil war primarily to weaken his civil war adversaries -- the pro-Western regimes and the advocates of moderation and pluralism within the region.

Had the United States recognized its own interest in prioritizing the aims of bin Laden's Muslim adversaries, it could have more effectively marginalized al-Qaida and other extremist groups by taking a supporting, not leading, role that featured a more measured combination of force and diplomacy.

Instead, the United States overcommitted itself, visibly imposing its own strategic goals on the conflict and, in the case of Iraq, blowing wide open a previously incontestable front in the Islamic civil war.

The predictable refusal of Muslims to accept an external solution to their civil war has led to widespread support for extremists, squeezing out moderate movements such as those led by Fatah in the Palestinian territories and Ayman Nour in Egypt. Imagine the furor that would have erupted during the American Civil War had England claimed the right to impose a solution to slavery upon the North and South.

Now Israel is falling into the same trap as the United States. Hezbollah has already gained in stature in Lebanon and the Muslim world since the fighting began. Lebanon's prime minister, Fouad Siniora, a Sunni who during a recent visit to Washington had spoken of the need to disarm Hezbollah, now speaks for a large segment of the Lebanese population when he praises the Shiite militants as honorable defenders of the homeland.

Shelved for the foreseeable future (and perhaps longer) amidst the violence is the referendum that was to express the Palestinians' authoritative opinion on a two-state solution.

This may be the last chance for the United States in the Middle East. The fault lines in the Islamic civil war have not yet fully rigidified.

By using its energies in service of the strategic goals of the extremists' Muslim and local adversaries (Mahmoud Abbas, the Lebanese government, those Shiites and Sunnis committed to a political solution in Iraq), the United States can court Muslim populations much more effectively than through the direct imposition of its own goals by military or politically manipulative means.

The extremist groups understand that without a critical mass of popular support, they cannot prevail against existing regimes, which will leave the door open for advocates of moderation who know that traditional autocratic rule cannot last forever in the Middle East in the face of its youthful demography, technological advancement and deepening world engagement.

Characterizing current global problems as the beginning of World War III only provokes further confrontation, which plays into the hands of extremist groups desperately struggling to win the Islamic civil war. The American people have an uncanny knack for transforming their visions into reality. If it is World War III that we envision, then, it seems likely it is World War III that we will ultimately get.

(Abdul Aziz Said is a professor and director of the Center for Global Peace at American University in Washington, D.C. Jim Zanotti is a research associate of the Center for Global Peace. This article is reprinted with permission from the Common Ground News Service.)

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