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Beijing (UPI) Aug 3, 2010 While China's economy continues to expand, specialists are warning that economic advancement might not quell its restive western Xinjiang province. Beijing has long recognized Xinjiang's importance. Records from the Ching dynasty observed, "Xinjiang protects the Great Wall in the east, shields Mongolia in the north, connects Tibet in the south, relies on Pamir Plateau in the west, occupies the ridge of mainland China, and is a commanding height in terms of its topographical feature. "If we have it, then it is sufficient to guard China and strengthen our fence." Now known as the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, tensions between Han Chinese immigrants and the indigenous ethnic Turkish Uighur population erupted in rioting in July 2009, leaving more than 150 people dead and 1,000 injured in Urumqi, Beijing's official news agency Xinhua reported, forcing the deployment of 20,000 police. More than than 1,400 people were subsequently arrested. Part of the reason for the unrest is economic. As Xinjiang's development has lagged behind the rest of the nation. In Xinjiang agriculture provides 40 percent of the economy and in 2009 gross domestic product per capita was 28 percent of the national level, with industrial production per capita reaching 6.3 percent of the national level. The Manchu Ching dynasty conquered Xinjiang in the 18th century but during the turmoil of World War II an independent Eastern Turkestan Republic was established in part of Xinjiang before the region was incorporated into the People's Republic of China in 1949. Xinjiang was subsequently declared one of China's autonomous regions, in deference to the fact that the majority of the population was Uighur. But massive Han immigration over the past decade has shifted the region's demographics, leading to increased ethnic tensions. On Monday Beijing's Liaowang weekly general affairs journal reported that Ma Dazheng, research fellow with the Border Area History and Geography Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, focused on these economic disparities, commenting: "Nowadays, the moment when development is talked about, people's interest is always focused on economic development. From local areas to departments, this thinking habit is very strong. "Xinjiang's development is definitely not limited to economic development. Numerous domestic and international cases have demonstrated that the economic development of an area does not necessarily mean that this area is stable. The development in Xinjiang must first bring practical benefits to the ordinary people in Xinjiang. The people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang are very unhappy regarding this issue. For 20 years, Xinjiang has not raised salaries. The overly low income distribution has become a major issue that affects the social development and stability of the people's hearts and minds across Xinjiang."
earlier related report With the Kabul embassy soon to be the largest in the world, displacing Baghdad, with a staff of more than 1,000 diplomats and officials seconded from a dozen U.S. government agencies and a security detail of another thousand, economic planning for a country in the midst of a guerrilla war is difficult under the best of circumstances. Defeated Germany and Japan in 1945 were tabula rasa. In Afghanistan, there is no clean slate. And a plethora of players with different agendas has coaxed Eikenberry into a defensive crouch. On July 22, the three-star Afghan war commander turned ambassador peppered his superiors in Washington with a barrage of questions to which he knows there is no consensus among the powers that be. "We would like to begin a discussion with Washington," said Eikenberry's e-mail message, "designed to refine our thinking about the current status of our civilian uplift, our ability to sustain civilian presence in Afghanistan, and our vision for the coming years. Changes on the ground will demand flexibility on the part of both Washington and the field and even greater attention to integrated CIV-MIL operations." And this in the ninth year of the Afghan war. Eikenberry kicked the can of "civilian uplift" down the rutted Afghan highway one more time when he said, "we believe it would be useful to re-examine as close as we could come to the entire stock of questions or issues that have been raised in Washington, Kabul, and the field " Meanwhile, the "civilian uplift" personnel buildup continues to mount. By last July 10, 1,146 American civilians had been deployed. But Eikenberry then asked, "What is the right number for our mission and do we have in place the right kind of metrics to self-evaluate and course correct?" If he doesn't know, maybe someone on Holbrooke's staff of 60-plus in Foggy Bottom can come up with an educated guesstimate. Among the 12 pages of questions, a bobbing and weaving Eikenberry conveyed the impression -- presumably inadvertently -- that he didn't have any answers for the questions he posed: "Are we doing an adequate job of identifying personnel who are not able to accomplish their civilian tasks due to deteriorating security environments and are we able to identify adroitly new temporary duties for such officers?" Passing the buck was the common thread of scores of questions that normally should have been followed with suggested answers for the interagency meetings in Washington, to wit, "If we have to pull teams back from the field to Kabul in the event of prolonged security threats in the months ahead can we house them and put them to work here or should they be redeployed to Washington or elsewhere?" If they volunteered for dangerous duty in Afghanistan, why would they want to be shipped home because of a prolonged security threat? Should there be a distinction between more dangerous to less dangerous field posts, with commensurate differences in incentives? Eikenberry presumably knows that what is less dangerous one week can be more dangerous the following week. The most urgent civilian problem is the billions salted away by contractors who get paid for work not done or abandoned half done. During the past three years, almost $20 billion in aid was delivered to Afghanistan but the government only had control over $1 billion in return for total transparency. But as Omar Zakhilwal, the finance minister pointed out in a letter to U.S. Rep. Nita Lowey, D-N.Y., "full transparency and effectiveness principles" aren't applied to the aid directly spent by donors and their contractors. Lowey held up $4 billion in aid to Afghanistan pending a thorough investigation of corruption on all sides -- Afghan, U.S. and individual NATO countries. Vast amounts of money exit Kabul airport on several daily flights to Dubai and Abu Dhabi -- all legally declared and authorized. During the last 3 1/2 years, Zakhilwal said $4.2 billion has been transferred in cash on outward bound flights. One strategically placed U.S. official confided privately, "The U.S. does not have the ability to manage the oversight needed to coordinate the efforts of over 1,000 civilian 'generalists' and 'specialists' with either the NATO forces or the Afghan government. Nor can we oversee the 100,000 plus contractors running around the country eating our lunch." The Taliban's strongest weapon is corruption on the government side. Holbrooke describes it as a "malignancy" that could destroy everything the United States and its allies are trying to achieve but have little to show for it after nine years. U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus says inadequate governance, corruption and abuse of power are the Taliban's best recruiters. After spending $345 billion, said this same American official, "we still do not have an Afghan government that can sustain itself." Each new strategy is given a catchy acronym. The latest is Civilian Uplift and Surge Taskforce for Economic Rehab -- CUSTER!
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![]() ![]() Washington (AFP) Aug 2, 2010 Amid growing clamor against the war in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has cautioned that large numbers of US troops will remain even after a "limited" July 2011 drawdown. Despite mounting casualties and public doubts, Gates said Sunday the US-led force was making headway and Taliban insurgents would not be able to wait out American forces because a major troop withdrawal was not ... read more |
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