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Analysis: Al-Qaida's Achilles' heel
Washington (UPI) Sep 18, 2007 Since President Bush's Labor Day visit to Iraq's Anbar province, questions have been raised regarding the pacification of what was not too long ago considered the most rebellious and dangerous of provinces in the country. Understandably, the Bush administration is trying to claim credit for the political and military turnaround in Anbar, asserting it was the "surge" of additional U.S. forces that allowed the pacification of the province. However, as with everything else in Iraq, the truth is far more complicated. Yes, the administration may well claim that in part at least, the addition of some 30,000 U.S. troops did play a role in bringing the insurgency down in Anbar. Yet, by all indications, and judging from what is going on in other regions of the country, it was not the surge alone that clinched the deal. What changed the political, and with it the military equation in Anbar was in the final analysis the local Sunni tribes, who for reasons of tribal concerns, turned against al-Qaida. What triggered the Sunni revolt against their former allies in the fight against the U.S. occupation was a question of family affairs. When al-Qaida tried to impose its will and laws by trying to force marriages between their fighters and women of the Iraqi Sunni tribes, it drew the ire of Sunni tribal leaders. Sunni sheiks suddenly saw in al-Qaida not the ally they once had in their fight to liberate Iraq from foreign intervention, but just another form of foreign occupation; this one perhaps even more dangerous than the U.S. occupation, given that they intended to remain in Iraq and integrate through marriage into Iraqi society. Turning to an age-old tradition that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, the Sunni tribes of Anbar turned to the United States for assistance. Uncle Sam was only too happy to oblige. So while Bush may claim there has been progress in parts of Baghdad and Anbar province, in fact what unfolded was a change of tactics on the part of the Sunni tribesmen. What ensued in Anbar between the Sunnis and the American forces was a marriage of convenience, a union of necessity, rather than one of love. The ingredients that led to the turnaround in Anbar were specific to that province, and re-creating the same scenario elsewhere would be practically impossible. First, elements that led to the revolt of the Sunni sheiks in Anbar would not be found in other provinces. In any case, unless there is significant political achievement in the country, the alliance between Anbar's tribes and the United States risks shifting back. However, what happened in Anbar and the clashes in north Lebanon's Nahr el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp, where the Lebanese army engaged in ferocious fighting over three months with members of an al-Qaida-backed militia called Fatah al-Islam, defeating them and killing their leader in the process, are major benchmarks in the ongoing war against terrorism. As in Iraq were the Sunnis demonstrated not only their ability to turn against al-Qaida, but to defeat them in battle, so too, has the Lebanese army shown that al-Qaida was far from invincible. In three months of severe clashes involving artillery duels, the Lebanese army suffered close to 200 casualties -- a huge number given the size of the Lebanese armed forces. But the determination of the Lebanese army showed that the answer to the infiltration of al-Qaida in Arab countries is to engage local forces in the battle, rather than foreign troops. The crushing defeat suffered by al-Qaida in Anbar and in north Lebanon is not to be underestimated. The terrorist organization will fight back in any way it can. They will conduct targeted assassinations of those who dared to oppose them, as they did in Iraq last week when they killed a prominent Sunni sheik who dared to defy them by publicly announcing his alliance to U.S. forces. Yet what we are seeing with the opposition to al-Qaida's interference in domestic affairs by the Iraqis and the Lebanese is highly significant. This in fact marks the third major setback suffered by Osama bin Laden's terrorist outfit in the Arab world. Their first defeat came in Saudi Arabia when Saudi forces, following an initial setback, were able to retake the upper hand, defeating, capturing or killing a number of cells operating in the desert kingdom. The second and third defeats came back-to-back with the victory of the Lebanese army over Fatah al-Islam and the routing of the Islamists from Anbar province. So does this spell the beginning of the end of al-Qaida in the Arab world? Certainly not. The group is losing in the Levant, but on the other hand it is making headway in North Africa, particularly in Morocco and Algeria. Still, the Lebanon and Iraq experiences are clear indications of their vulnerability. (Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times.) (e-mail: [email protected]) Community Email This Article Comment On This Article Related Links The Long War - Doctrine and Application
Analysis: Berlin debates anti-terror moves Berlin (UPI) Sep 17, 2007 Germany is still heatedly debating tougher security measures roughly two weeks after authorities arrested three terror suspects who planned to carry out massive bombings against U.S. institutions and other targets. |
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