In recent years, cooperation between the two has collapsed and evolved into debate over which branch the Constitution grants the most power to in intelligence matters.

In the aftermath of Sept. 11, misinformation over weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and last December's revelation of a secret National Security Agency wiretapping program, the efficacy of Congress's power of oversight has been widely debated.

The report and forum participants argued that partisan squabbling and poor reorganization of the committees has rendered the oversight process ineffective and that the onus to repair the relationship should fall to Congress.

The report, entitled "No Mere Oversight: Congressional Oversight of Intelligence is Broken," states that Congress has failed in their mission both to ensure that the intelligence community has the tools that it needs to fight terrorism threats at home and abroad and to make sure that those tools are consistent with the law and the Constitution.

It maintains, however, that the current problems do not require a drastic restructuring of oversight structure but rather state that Congress has the tools needed to be effective, including the ability to conduct investigations into programs and staff, and the power to conduct oversight hearings -- but is currently not executing them.

According to Britt Snider, former counsel for the Select Committee on Intelligence and special counsel to CIA Director George Tenet, the history of congressional oversight is unique; the United States was the first country to grant intelligence oversight responsibilities to a legislative body.

During the '70s and early '80s, cooperation between the two branches and the absence of party-line divisions were highly beneficial for intelligence gathering and synthesis. But now their symbiotic relationship has virtually collapsed.

"The system worked before because it operated on a bipartisan basis," said Snider. "I don't view this as a political problem -- it's a good government problem."

The result of their mutual failure has many adverse implications, but one such problem is that without an effective oversight committee, the public has nowhere to relay their concerns and complaints.

"When the intelligence committees choose not to delve into these issues, we are left only with executive branch assurances. Can we rely on these?" asked Snider.

Charles Battalgia, former senior staff on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, agreed with Snider's analysis of increased partisanship as the root of the problem. Only with better leadership and cooperation can the oversight failure be repaired, he said.

"They never had a golden age," said Battalgia. "There was always some degree of partisanship, but now there's a great deal. Before, the bosses were getting along, and all cooperated well."

John Moseman, former director of CIA congressional affairs, said that the tools exist currently but those tools need to be placed in the right hands. He called for an improvement in the leadership and staffing of oversight committees. Members of these committees should be of the most "solid" and "stalwart" stock in Congress, he said.

This would require what Moseman called a "rare breed" of committee members who "don't want to spend a lot of time on Sunday talk shows" but would rather be committed to providing the support the intelligence community needs.

"We've got to figure out how to put the best and capable leaders in charge, make them permanent and ring the raw politics out of oversight," said Moseman.

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