Taking these issues into account, a policy brief just published by the Stanley Foundation, a non-partisan think tank focusing on peace and security issues, details discussions undertaken at a September 2005 conference in Dubai. Meeting to formulate 21st Century alternatives to Persian Gulf security frameworks were analysts and government officials from the Arab Gulf states, Iran, Iraq, Japan, China, the European Union and the United States.

The participants, who were only identified by country and not by name, collectively recognized two catalysts for change that could cause a reconsideration of security interests in the region: the fact that regional and external powers "are recognizing the importance of Gulf security for the continued growth of the economic system" and that energy concerns could lead growing economic powers to compete with, and "dilute" the United States' hegemony in the region.

Secondly, developments in the war on terror have made regional and global cooperation on security issues not only necessary but unavoidable. Participants recognized that cooperation on these issues was not possible from "a balance of power, state-centric perspective."

Several scenarios for regional security were put forward over the course of the conference: among them, a Persian Gulf security arrangement modeled on arrangements in Northeast and Southeast Asia. In this scenario, the United States would reverse several decades of foreign policy and initiate a dialogue with Iran, just as American leaders chose to engage with China 30 years ago, and thereby encourage economic partnerships among smaller, surrounding countries in Asia.

"Iran is a country of 75 million people," Christopher A. Preble, director of foreign policy studies at Cato Institute said of the conference findings. "It's unrealistic to expect that we can exclude them from any conceptions of Middle East security."

Just as U.S. policy of 30 years ago focused on Iran as one of the security partners in the "Twin Pillars" strategy, Persian Gulf security discussions of today now focus on Iran in a negative sense, questioning how any security framework can be built while the country seeks to assert a position of regional leader. Participant recommendations focused on "socioeconomic confidence-building measures" and the evolution of the Gulf region away from a "military zone of competition" and into a zone of "economic cooperation."

But most analysts recognized that as long as the United States dominates the region and Iran seeks to undermine this dominance, other Gulf States and external global powers with a stake in the region would be reduced to the status of "friends" or "enemies" of one or the other. As an Iranian participant remarked, "The Gulf States need to put more trust in their relationship with Iran and realize the strategic commonalities between their states." The current strategic framework leads to the presumption that Iran is a threat that requires the counterbalancing force of the United States and a situation in which "each side believes that the other is the locus of the security deficit in the region."

Participants variously framed Iran's motives for acquiring nuclear weapons as a misguided quest for "legitimacy in the international community," an internal goal with historical roots that "has become an issue of national pride" and an attempt to counter threats perceived by Iranian leaders, "that all states are allied with the United States, which makes them a threat to Iran."

As one European participant recognized, "The problem is that Iran itself engages in zero-sum competitive behavior that makes many governments wary of engaging Iran productively." Consequently, Iran seeks nuclear weapons as a means of achieving a moral victory on the world stage. American analysts at the conference suggested that a more business-like approach to foreign policy would help Iran to achieve the approval it seeks.

A major area of contention is the issue of how much latitude Iran should be given when interacting with the internal affairs of its neighbor, Iraq. While acknowledging that regional power has shifted to Iran and Turkey, one participant noted that Iran owes a great deal to the United States for eliminating two of its greatest threats -- Saddam Hussein and the Taliban government in Afghanistan -- and for establishing a "government composition in Iraq that is very favorable to Iran." After inconclusively discussing whether or not Iraq's fragmented religious and ethnic groups could be forged into a viable nation-state, one Iranian participant pointed out that his country has motives for encouraging both success and failure in Iraq.

Many argued that the "natural geographic proximity driving Iranian concerns" makes the United States' interference in and destabilization of Iraq seem hypocritical.

"Some nationalistic Iranians," the report summarizes, "are not thinking about Iraq per se, but instead are focusing on U.S. involvement in the region and how to teach a lesson to those Yankees in Iraq." Conversely, an Iraq destabilized by a U.S. pullout and an almost certain civil war would destroy Iran's chances at building bilateral economic ties and potentially spark internal problems with its own Kurdish minorities.

Most participants agreed that while the establishment of an Iraqi Shia government is important for Iran's strategic goals, it is not an "end in itself" and should be just one step in decreasing U.S. involvement in the area. Citing recent House Intelligence committee findings and his own personal assessment of the situation, Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute remarked, "I do not believe that it is in Iran's best interests to see Iraq descend into a bloody civil war."

External powers with a stake in the region, such as China, Japan and the European Union, expressed a desire to see "a better-defined, balanced and equitable U.S. leadership role, as opposed to U.S. hegemony." Within this security framework, major outside powers would feel more comfortable investing in trade and new energy projects, Gulf Arab states could comfortably negotiate with both Iran and the United States without risking the wrath of either power, and all countries could provide "aid for domestic political developments in the region."

Participants recognized that while the United States will always have a vested interest in the security of the Persian Gulf, a subtle shift towards bilateral negotiations and more cooperative action could reap enormous economic and socio-political benefits for the region.

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