There are high expectations, as well as trepidations depending upon which country, which power viewed India in their strategic interest. Cold warriors are concerned that their pet occupation of India-baiting is under attack.

Aspirant Asian power pole, the People's Republic of China, apprehends that India's economic challenge may be compounded with significant new expanded power. The Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement holds vast dimensions in the economic, commercial and environmental areas, other than the nuclear weapons questions with India's clearly defined doctrine of "no first use".

Unfortunately, the anti-proliferation lobby in the U.S. appears determined to view the agreement through the very small aperture of proliferation, or V-SAP. Faced with the fact that India's proliferation history has been totally clean, this non-proliferation club has come up with the argument that the agreement will signal the demise of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

To remind the nay-sayers in Washington, India was among the founding countries of the NPT regime and is on the Board of Governors in the International Atomic Energy Agency. The non-proliferation lobby needs to ask themselves why India did not join the NPT after working for it. It became a toothless, discriminatory regime. It did not prevent proliferation, but countries like India with a clean record were placed in the doghouse.

The non-proliferation ideologues are today challenged to answer from where did Saddam Hussein, Iran and North Korea get their nuclear weapons technology. All technology came from the West, including some from the United States.

Today, these transactions are on record. Nothing much is said about A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons work, and his proliferation to Libya, Iran and, according to some reports, even to Saudi Arabia.

The mother of all proliferators, whether nuclear weapons technology or missile technology, is China. Among the documents handed over to the U.S. by Libya related to its nuclear weapons program, some have notes in Chinese. The transfers to Libya were from China routed through Pakistan. It will be difficult to convince a layman that Dr. Khan conducted his nuclear proliferation network without the knowledge of the Pakistan Army establishment, which controls the country's nuclear program. The anti-proliferation guardians appear to have ignored proliferation facts.

Actions against China's proliferation have always been a farce. China's record of empowering Pakistan into an independent nuclear weapons state is well known. Pakistan's nuclear weapon was tested in China's Lop Nor nuclear site. There are circumstantial evidence to suggest that Chinese weapons experts were present during Pakistan nuclear tests in 1998 following the Indian tests. In late 1991, Beijing agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime with Washington. It, however, transferred about 88 nuclear-capable missiles to Pakistan in the months following. The American agencies had all the proof, including photographs, but a presidential determination was not made. The maximum U.S. punitive action has been on some Chinese entities and, that too, for certain periods.

The position of the American non-proliferation confounds many observers, especially in India. Is there a method in this madness? China, of course, continues its proliferation to Pakistan in quest of technological finesse and sophistication. Little attention has been paid to the May 2005 agreement under which China will transfer civilian technology to Bangladesh. The agreement, of course, takes care of IAEA inspection and Dhaka is a signatory to the NPT. Then, it has not prevented NPT signatories to surreptitiously embark on the nuclear weapons path with able assistance from Beijing. This is an open truth.

China's official news agency, Xinhua, in a report datelined Beijing, March 4, pointed out that the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal "effectively accepted India's status as a nuclear weapons power." This report also quoted Congressman Edward Markey stating that it is meaningless (for India) to have a "safeguarded" civilian nuclear program if there is an "unsafeguarded military nuclear program sitting next to it." Congressman Markey, who is co-Chairman of the House Nuclear Non-proliferation Task Force, has made other statements on similar lines. The Congressman does not seem to have made statements on record over China's proliferation history.

The stand of the U.S. non-proliferation lobby appears astounding. They have buried the record of the real proliferator and have singled out India for attack. To many, it suggests that India may have been singled out to cover the nuclear proliferation of the proliferations to the rogue states. This is a Chinese strategic doctrine and also propagated by Beijing's friends, that India is perceived as a proliferator.

Leaving aside the nuclear weapons issue, there is much more to the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement. India has not got a nuclear weapon sweetheart deal out of it. In fact, its weapons program would be far more constricted. India, on its part, does not want a huge nuclear arsenal. It needs an effective deterrent capability to retaliate to a nuclear strike, in dimensions more than one.

The main flow from this agreement is that it brings the world's most powerful democracy and the world's largest democracy on the same platform for the first time in history. The potentials are immense in an increasingly one-family world where the focus is on development, upliftment of the have-nots and a safe environment and security. It is not a "mangoes" for "nuclear" deal as Congressman Edward Markey recently commented. The nay-sayers must learn to widen their vision beyond V-SAP, unless some follow an agenda written from beyond the shores of America.

The practical visionaries in the U.S. are just beginning to see clearly the benefits of an Indo-U.S. equal partnership. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is beginning to see the profits from India's market liberalization that will accrue from a partnership of equality. If the U.S. Congress keeps the restrictive laws in place, there can be no real trust or partnership.

There are two wide basic aspects the Congress must consider when debating the nuclear agreement. First, the economic aspect. The civilian nuclear cooperation will unlock an estimated $60 billion market in nuclear power construction in which U.S. companies can jostle. With established cooperation the opportunities in economic and commerce are limitless. In the case of India and the U.S. culture, language, laws and work ethics are compatible. It is not so with China where, despite the booming economic and trade activity and economic liberalization, the basic system is command-driven from the political angle.

In the strategic and security realm, the U.S. under President Bush is trying to clean up the cold war cobwebs. Not that all roadblocks will be removed immediately, but this agreement will be a good start. The Congress would be well advised to take into calculations the vital U.S. interests in Asia.

The critical Indian Ocean sea-lanes are as important for U.S. Security interests as for trade interests. So is the air space. When the push came to a shove during the Afghan War after "9/11," the U.S. air force was facilitated by India, and the Indian navy escorted U.S. navy ships through the Malacca Strait water-ways.

There were vital strategic resources India put at the U.S.'s disposal, but if the country is kept under sanctions the cooperation will break down after some time. After all, any Indian government serves at the pleasure of its people unlike that of China and Pakistan. The Indian voter is politically highly astute on issues, including foreign policy issues.

The India-specific anti-proliferation lobby in Washington has a lot to answer about rampant proliferation from other countries. India is not Iran or North Korea. It is the China-Pakistan proliferation axis which transferred technology to Iran and North Korea. While arguing against India, this lobby must answer these questions to establish their minimum credibility, if they had any.

Raman Bhaskar is an specialist on strategic and foreign policy issues, based in New Delhi. United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.

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