UPI: What do you see as the main strategic challenge facing the United States in its "long war" against terrorism and Islamist extremism?

Hoffmann: Successful as we have been in the physical aspects of the war on terror, we have been moving too slowly on the political and strategic side.

Some 75 percent of al-Qaida's leadership at the time of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks have been killed or captured. Its training bases and logistics have been smashed in Afghanistan. (However) what we are seeing is a revolution in terrorist communications. They can control every aspect of a story and tailor their message. They even control the production communication of this message.

Q. Can you give some examples of this approach?

A. The apotheosis of this process is Hezbollah and its television station, al-Manar, the Lighthouse, or Beacon.

In Iraq, the insurgents have been utilizing three vehicles whenever they carry out a car bomb attack. One carries the explosives, another, the bomber or the remote control device to detonate the bomb and the third carries a crew with equipment to videotape it and post it on the Internet.

They are acting like the Associated Press, Agence France Presse and Reuters. They are posting compelling content of their attacks in real time.

They are influencing the news and the reporting of the news in ways that were unimaginable. Last fall, al-Qaida presented its own news show on its Web site -- The Voice of the Caliphate.

Q. How important is the Internet to the Islamists' grand strategy and outreach to the Muslim world?

A. From the terrorists' point of view the Internet has become the most powerful and inexpensive form of communication yet developed. (It has allowed them to produce their own) parallel media (and) to present their own highly warped, idiosyncratic version of the truth.

There are already reportedly more than 4,000 jihadi Web sites. They convey their conspiracy theories, which are a mix of fact and fiction, and present very effective propaganda that is believable to their target audience.

Q. What kind of dilemma does this present to the United States and the other major democracies?

A. Truth, veracity and objectivity have been hijacked from under our noses. We have to fight effectively in this virtual battlefield. Even now, we don't understand their minds and communications (or) how they communicate. We are unable to craft our own messages in response.

Q. Is the United States Government waking up to the real nature of this challenge?

A. We are getting it out, but we have lost an enormous amount of time. We can still catch up, but it is late. We know how to with this. We were doing it throughout the Cold War. We were very effective through World War II and the Cold War.

Q. Is the goal of countering the jihadis' message around the world, especially on the Internet, something that we can achieve quickly or must it be seen as part of a "long war" strategy for this country?

A. This is going to take decades to achieve. We have to be looking over the horizon. The next generation (of jihadi guerrillas) is training now. They're lost. We have to look at the next generation after them. The youth bulge in the Muslim world today.

There are children (being held) in Abu Ghraib. What are we going to do about them? How do we rehabilitate them?

Q. What kind of communications strategy do you advocate to counter the jihadis?

A. We have tried selling America (to the Arab world). It hasn't worked. There is a vacuum on the Internet that we have ignored and they have been very active on that front.

(Right now) we just condemn the (jihadist) message. But that is a defensive ball game. We have got to be on the offensive. Even though it is reporting elements of the truth, we don't point out and expose their falsehoods, especially their simplistic conspiracy theories that have no element of truth.

Q. Does the United States need to build or reactivate any communications structures to achieve this goal?

A. We have an aversion to (public broadcasting) information -- but it was an essential element to win the Cold War. The United States Information Agency was gutted in the 1990s and made subservient to the State Department. I don't think we have ever recovered from that. The lesson now is that (gutting) it was a mistake. And we need to set it right.

I have not seen any discussion of its rejuvenation. We thought we could dispense with it more than a decade ago. (But) USIA was extremely active in pushing back communism. A vacuum was created with its destruction). We are just realizing the importance of the capabilities we have had.

Q. Are you arguing for an expansion of U.S. public diplomacy with an activation of the structures needed to achieve it as a crucial part of our broader strategy in this struggle?

A. I am arguing that now we have achieved that fundamental base line expectation we need to move forward. We need to bring more tools to the tool box. How can we marshal out resources to break the (Islamists') cycle of recruitment? It is how we are going to win the war -- by breaking their ability to recruit and win and recognize their audience.

How many voices of moderate Islam are there on Web sites to promote tolerance and pluralism? We have to work with our own TV stations otherwise stations like Hezbollah's al-Manar are going to get the audiences. Our credibility has been compromised. We need to work with the European Union where appropriate and with the NGOs. We need a strategy that also pursues the State Department's aim of countering violent extremism.

The Internet has become the jihadis' playing field. It is low cost. The expenses aren't huge. Just pushing back there would be significant, but we have to do it right. It may be working through existing institutions in the Muslim world and the Muslim Diaspora.

Q. There appears to have been very little discussion of these issues yet in the general media. Are they being taken sufficiently seriously with in the U.S. government itself?

A. More and more this is becoming a front-burner issue in the State Department and at the Pentagon. There is more of a recognition that (there is a need) to create a climate where military force isn't the first resort or even necessary. As we go through different phases we have to adapt our tactics. We have got to be effective.

Q. Are they ahead of us in their Internet communications strategies? And if they are, do we still have any chance to catch up with them?

A. Virtually every terrorist group in the world is now on the Internet. Hezbollah and Hamas saw an opportunity and they seized it. Al-Qaida in the late 1980s had set up four committees including one for communications so they realized the importance of this. As Peter Bergen observed in "Holy War," they are perfectly prepared to harness modern technology in pursuit of their austere and archaic goals. They understand their viability and credibility is in their ability (to reach their massive target audience). Whoever is first at harnessing mass communications has a tremendous advantage. They have had a tremendous head-start and allocated their resources, but it isn't too late (for us) to act. If we don't, we'll be fighting this war for generations.

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