Speaking at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, Makiya said that the constitution reflected and reinforced the Iraqis' failure to overcome social divisions that have worsened in the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam.

"I seriously underestimated our ability to find a federal, territorial solution and not an ethnic, sectarian solution," he said.

According to Makiya, a constitution cannot be drafted successfully before mistakes that fuelled the insurgency are corrected. One such error was the decision by the United States to disband the Iraqi army following the invasion. "Demilitarization was a failure," he said. "You should never humiliate those you have you defeated."

Nor has the process of 'de-Baathification' been completed, said Makiya, suggesting that Saddam loyalists are still driving the violence in Iraq.

"We underestimated the powerful reach of the Baath party inside Iraq. The rushing through of the constitution was a mistake. The central factor is the insurgency, which is creating tensions that could drive the constitution one way or the other. First we must deal with the insurgency."

And Makiya was also critical of the constitution itself: "This is a fundamentally destabilizing document. It cannot work," he said.

What exactly is wrong with the constitution?

"The entire constitution was written as a reaction to Iraq's history," said Rend Rahim, Iraqi ambassador-designate to the United States until Oct. 2004, explaining that many of the new provisions are negative responses to Iraq's experience of totalitarianism. Under the new framework central government is extremely weak, she said. The system lacks the checks and balances necessary to safeguard democracy.

"Parliament is paramount and almost unchallenged. The only real check to parliament is the supreme court. The president has virtually no power," said Rahim. Under the constitution, presidential opposition to legislation would be limited to returning bills to parliament for second and third readings.

Much legislation would require only a "majority of quorum." Some laws could be passed with only 26 or 27 percent of the parliamentary vote.

But the federal aspects of the constitution remain of greatest concern, said Rahim. "Relations between central government and the regions are fuzzy. A very large section of government falls within the overlap."

Rahim worries that while Iraq operates under "almost total devolution," the constitution makes "absolutely no mention" of how relations between central government and the region will work.

What's more, with the exception of the Kurdish north, largely autonomous since the early 1990s, "institutions in the regions are non-existent apart from the militias." Rahim believes that power is being placed in the hands of regional governments who lack the frameworks they need to guarantee stability and co-operate with the center.

Security was a particular worry, she said. Under the constitution, each region would have its own regional guard. "But where the regional guard will enter the national security apparatus in not clear."

And when it comes to the equitable distribution of oil revenues, she is no more confident. "There is the optimistic assumption that everything will be done by consensus. Failing consensus, regional laws will prevail," she said, raising the prospect of internecine scrapping over funds: Iraq's oil reserves are unevenly spread throughout the country, the majority lying in the Kurdish north and predominantly Shiite south, leading Iraq's Sunni community to fear losing out if control of the oil fields passes to the regions.

Not everyone is pessimistic, however. Qubad Talabani, Representative of the Kurdish Regional Government to the United States, says that there is a chance central government can make itself effective. "Constitutions are vague, even in the United States," he said. "The central government does have power, but it depends who is in power. We need to focus on finding a government that can interpret the constitution."

Nor need the constitution necessarily alienate Sunnis, said Talabani. "Regionalism causes alarm for Iraqi nationalists. But this constitution protects the Sunnis as much as it protects the Kurds and Shiites."

According to Talabani, overcoming ethnic division has less to do with legislative infrastructure than the ability of a strong and stable government to build trust between communities through communication. "Peoples' sense of identity is different from what it was before the war," he said. "Insecurity makes people more likely to define themselves first as a, Sunni, a Shiite or a Kurd:" Stability in central government could help to recreate an Iraqi identity.

But whether optimistic or pessimistic, there is widespread feeling among Iraqis that the constitution, however imperfect, represents the only choice if Iraq is to overcome its divisions and move toward political normality, says Munthir al-Fadhal, a delegate to the Iraqi National Assembly and member of the constitutional drafting committee.

"Despite my reservations, I will be the first person to vote yes for the constitution because the alternative is chaos," he said.

Iraq votes on Oct. 15.

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