Most of the comments related to my column on the price the United States is paying for the very poor infantry tactics of our forces on the ground in Afghanistan that have made them increasingly dependent on close air support.

Boris M. wrote, "I wonder if this is the result of bad tactics or the logical consequences of the zero (American) casualty policy followed by the United States since the Vietnam War."

Emery Nelson added, "The question that needs to be asked is, 'Would you rather win with higher casualties, or lose with few casualties?'"

I am not sure adopting Third Generation War infantry tactics in place of Second Generation ones would result in higher casualties. It might do so in individual engagements, but it might reduce total friendly casualties in the war.

Airstrikes serve as one of the most effective recruiting tools of America's opponents in Afghanistan, both because of the civilians killed and because when you attack someone from an invulnerable position -- that is to say, an altitude of 20,000 feet above the ground -- you make him want to fight you all the more.

If U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan deprived their opponents of the recruits that U.S. Air Force airstrikes generate by generating collateral damage and civilian casualties, then might U.S. total casualties very well go down?

Bob P. writes, "We call for airstrikes because that's what you do to equalize combat power when you are outnumbered."

Later he added, "Most AARs in Afghanistan start with a platoon getting ambushed by approximately equivalent forces; then the enemy forces through various means (the part I won't discuss) obtain local superiority. Platoon calls in airstrikes. ... "

I find it interesting that the opponents of the U.S. ground forces operating in Afghanistan appear better at concentrating forces at the decisive point than the U.S. armed forces are.

I wonder if two Third Generation War tactical concepts might help U.S. forces on the ground in Afghanistan.

The first is Schwerpunkt -- the importance of focusing forces on the decisive focal point of a battle or conflict. The second is the importance of maintaining a strong reserve, normally at least one-third of available troops.

In contrast, Second Generation War tactics scatter forces in penny-packets and regard troops in reserve as "wasted" because they are not engaging the enemy. Does that describe what the U.S. armed forces are now doing in Afghanistan?

Jeffrey R. writes: "I do not agree that our officers are not well read and educated on 'good' tactics. Remember, they have to operate in a 'system' that does not reward innovation and success."

That is certainly true of the U.S. military system. But it is also true that the U.S. military's educational system offers little real education. Mostly, it just trains people in one way to do something. If an American officer wants broad education in alternative tactics, he has to educate himself.

(William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation.)

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