One of the most common signs that America's leadership is clueless about Fourth Generation war is the language they use.

Fourth Generation war has few if any defining moments. Nor does it have "turning points," another common Bushism. In his testimony to Congress, U.S. Gen. David Petraeus revealed the limits on his own grasp of 4GW when he said, "We've got to continue. We have our teeth into the jugular, and we need to keep it (sic) there."

Opponents in 4GW have no jugular. 4GW is war of the capillaries. What U.S. forces have their teeth into in Iraq is a jellyfish.

If we are to see Iraq and other Fourth Generation conflicts as they are and not through the looking glass, we need to use words more carefully.

Because there is no state in Iraq, there is also no government. Orders given in Baghdad have no meaning, because there are no state institutions to carry them out. The governmental positions of Iraqi leaders have no substance. Their power is a function of their relationship to various militias, not of their offices. Maliki has no militia, which means he is a figurehead.

The Iraqi "army" and "police" are groupings of Shiite militias that exist to fight other militias and take orders from militia leaders, not the government. Government revenues are slush funds militia leaders use to pay their militiamen. All of these phenomena, and many more, are products of the one basic reality: there is no state.

The failure of Maliki's "big push" into Basra put Iraq's statelessness on display. Ordered to do something it did not want to do, the Iraqi "army" fell apart, as militias usually fall apart when given unwelcome directives. Iraqi "soldiers" and "police" went over or went home, in considerable numbers. Those who did fight had little fight in them; the affair reportedly ended with the Mahdi Army controlling more of Basra than it did at the beginning. Maliki, desperate for a cease-fire, had to agree in advance to any conditions Moqtada Sadr cared to impose.

American policy proved even more reckless than that of Maliki. To win in Iraq, U.S. policymakers must see a state re-emerge. That means U.S. forces should stay out of the way of anyone with the potential to recreate a state. Sadr is at or near the head of the list. The Maliki "government" isn't even on it.

So what did the U.S. government do? Why, it went to war against Sadr on behalf of Maliki, of course. The American leadership cannot grasp one of the most basic facts about 4GW, namely that the splintering of factions makes it more difficult to generate a state. Should the United States have the bad luck to "win" this latest fight and destroy the Mahdi Army, it will move not toward but further away from that goal.

In the end, the Bush administration's -- and the Pentagon's -- insistence that the Iraqi state, government, army and police are real blinds only themselves. Iraqis know they are not. The American public knows they are not. Anyone in Africa or Asia probably knows they are not. Do the members of the U.S. Senate committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations know less that the average inhabitant of Africa or Asia? So the congressional hearings on Iraq suggest, and such is the power of empty words.

William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation.

earlier related report
Feature: Iraq police under scrutiny
Errant Iraqi police and criminal elements within their ranks are in the cross-hairs of U.S. forces in a move to protect improved security and sectarian reconciliation in Muqdadiya and its surrounding villages.

At the same time, closer scrutiny is being paid to the Sons of Iraq neighborhood watch volunteer groups to increase discipline and ensure Iraqi government rules are followed to the letter.

"We're going to continue to communicate that sectarianism isn't going to do anyone any good," said Lt. Col. Rod Coffey, commander of the regiment responsible for Muqdadiya and its surrounding areas. "Also, we are simply going to arrest any IP (Iraqi Police) that breaks the law.

"Now if an IP breaks the law it's generally because he is doing something sectarian -- kidnapping or something. So we are going to continue to arrest corrupt IPs, and that's corrupt not just in the economic sense but also in the sectarian sense."

There are about 1,800 IPs -- who come under the authority of the national Ministry of Interior -- in the Muqdadiya area, which is about 65 miles north of Baghdad. The vast majority of them are Shiites, a situation that arose when Muqdadiya's Sunnis (about 60 percent of the population) mostly boycotted provincial and national elections in 2005. The result was a Shiite-dominated national government and apparatus. Locally, Sunni representation in Diyala province's legislative council is only about 17 out of more than 45 seats.

Since U.S. and Iraqi forces pushed al-Qaida-Iraq and nationalist insurgents out of the province late last year and early this year, U.S. commanders have focused on bridging the sectarian divide in the province, which erupted in violence in 2006 and was exacerbated and exploited by al-Qaida.

With new provincial elections slated for October and Sunnis set to participate in greater numbers this time, there is also the suspicion that some of the kidnappings are part of a political "Tammany Hall" effort on the part of some political factions within the city as well as opportunity targeting by rogue, criminal elements of the police.

"There have been many incidents of IPs stopping kidnappings taking place but not turning people in," said Capt. Mike Stinchfield, commander of 3/2's Hawk Company, which this month raided the al-Askeri section of Muqdadiya to snag kidnapping suspects. "Many of them are scared of the others."

"I think there are many IPs that want to do the right thing. They have shown it; even the people we talk to on our patrols say it. We don't need to dismantle the IPs, just rid it of some criminal elements."

The raid on al-Askeri netted nine detainees. Six strongly suspected of being members of a kidnapping ring targeting Sunnis were later released for lack of evidence sufficient -- that time -- for their prosecution in an Iraqi court. Two were formally arrested. One of them was in possession of about a dozen IP identity cards.

During the cordon-and-search operation, all military-age males in the district were "white boarded," meaning their photographs and fingerprints were taken, irises scanned and personal information taken for entry into a database.

The operation, dubbed Wolfpack Enforcer, is ongoing throughout the city. Also ongoing is Hawk Company's daily visits to IP stations to whiteboard their officers and for spot checks of personnel on duty and their actions.

Straightening up the Sons of Iraq, formerly known as Concerned Local Citizens, is a different operation, involving troops doing spot checks on SOI checkpoints, checking duty rosters, stopping SOI personnel who are away from their posts but carrying their weapons or wearing their identifying reflective sashes.

"All we are going to do, since this is the legitimate line of operation, is enforce Iraqi government laws in regard to the SOI," Lt. Col. Coffey said. "They can't have heavy weapons, they cannot conduct offensive operations, meaning they are guarding their neighborhood. They are not to wander around, they are not to go into another town -- that's all we're going to do, enforce Iraqi law."

Coffey said sectarian bloodletting in 2006 and part of 2007 resulted in a change in Muqdadiya's many mixed-sect districts. Sunnis pushed out Shiites, who were replaced by Sunnis pushed out of other districts by Shiites and visa versa. The result, when SOIs were first formed, was basically a sectarian-divided structure since the volunteers are drawn from, and guard, their own neighborhoods.

(They) were raised rapidly in Muqdadiya for a very good reason -- there was a lot of fighting in Muqdadiya at the time. It was very unstable," Coffey said. "Unfortunately, one of the byproducts with that was a senior Sunni CLC leader and a senior Shiite CLC leader. So it reinforces the sectarian divide. That's what we're slowly going to work through.

"Right now the leaders of the CLC, now called SOI, have a stake in being non-sectarian."

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