In fact, Musharraf, like the rest of the world, noted that Democratic frontrunner for the White House Hillary Clinton, who voted for the Iraqi war, is now calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq to begin in 90 days. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid calls Iraq "the worst foreign policy mistake in American history" as senators prepare legislation that would revoke authorization for the war.

Musharraf can also see that two-thirds of U.S. voters are against the war. The corollary is what happens in Afghanistan if the United States does not prevail in Iraq. He began hedging his bets with a controversial deal signed last Sept. 5 with tribal leaders in North Waziristan, a Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) on the Afghan border. Tribal elders, who are Muslim fundamentalists and pro-Taliban, guaranteed Taliban guerrillas would be held in check and not allowed to cross into Afghanistan.

Skeptical NATO and U.S. commanders in Afghanistan decided to give Musharraf the benefit of the doubt. Today, there is no doubt. Both North and South Waziristan are under virtual Taliban control and attacks into Afghanistan have trebled. Even more worrisome, Pakistan's all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency, ISI, received a wink and a nod from Musharraf to assist "moderate" Taliban elements in their campaign to wrest control from President Hamid Karzai in Kabul.

On Feb. 19, the New York Times, in a front page article about al-Qaida's revival in Pakistan, reported U.S. intelligence has spotted small al-Qaida training camps in North Waziristan. That this tribal area was entirely in Taliban and al-Qaida hands was originally reported in this space in October 2005 following this reporter's unauthorized trip there.

Mohammad Aurakzai, the Musharraf-appointed governor of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier province, described the Taliban as waging "a war of liberation" against foreign troops occupying Afghanistan. Local populations, he added, are "increasingly supporting Taliban."

ISI was the Taliban's principal support when it launched an offensive in 1992 to seize control of a country torn by multiple warring factions ever since defeated Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. The Taliban declared victory in 1996, and imposed a medieval theocracy on almost 30 million people while embracing Osama bin Laden who then set up a score of al-Qaida training camps. Following 9/11, U.S. forces collapsed the whole Taliban-al-Qaida edifice, which ended with the battle of Tora Bora, and bin Laden's escape into Pakistan.

Musharraf cordially loathes Karzai. When President Bush, hoping for reconciliation, had them both to dinner at the White House last Sept. 28, they avoided each other's gaze and declined to shake hands. It's been downhill since then, each side hurling insults at the other. Karzai's writ doesn't extend much beyond Kabul. His government is riddled with corruption and Afghanistan is fast becoming a narco-state (producing last year a record 6,700 tons of opium poppy, enough to make about 670 tons of pure heroin), fertile ground for Taliban successes. And Karzai's warm relationship with India , "our most cherished partner" , further exacerbates relations with Pakistan.

Musharraf is constantly criticized in his own media for throwing in his lot with the U.S. after 9/11. He had little choice in the matter. President Bush gave him none. But in the wake of the U.S. fiasco in Iraq, politico-religious extremists are steadily gaining ground in what is a military-ruled "guided democracy."

The banned militant sectarian Sunni terrorist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, involved in most terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 9/11, is forming new cells at the district and provincial levels throughout the country. Its leaders fought in Afghanistan and the cadres and recruits came from madrassas (Koranic schools) throughout the country.

In a major speech last week, Bush rang a loud Afghan alarm bell coupled with a ringing endorsement of Musharraf. He also called on NATO member states to supply more troops and to cease and desist putting restrictions on their roles and missions in the field. Italy, France and Spain declined additional forces. NATO's bean counters estimate the daily cost of keeping one soldier in Afghanistan at $4,000. There are now 35,000 troops in Afghanistan under NATO command, including 13,000 Americans. Another 9,000 U.S. troops operate independently of NATO on counter-terrorism and Afghan army training missions. And following a brief visit to Kabul, Defense Secretary Bob Gates diverted the 173rd Airborne Brigade slated for Iraq to Afghanistan and ordered a brigade of the 10th Mountain Division to stay another four months.

Meanwhile, public and political support for a close U.S.-Pakistan partnership is rapidly evaporating in a Muslim country with the world's second largest Muslim population -- and a nuclear arsenal. Pakistani extremists are making their views known with suicide bombings in major cities, including Islamabad, and rocket and mortar attacks on mosques. By Musharraf's own reckoning, there are about 1.6 million people willing to push extremist agendas through acts of violence -- or one percent of the population.

Pakistan's 1,400-mile border with Afghanistan is more porous than the U.S.-Mexican frontier. The Pakistani army flew reporters to North Waziristan to meet with tribal elders last week, but they didn't show up.

In his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Anthony H. Cordesman said, "No one can return from visiting the front in Afghanistan without realizing there is a very real risk that the U.S. and NATO could lose their war with al-Qaida, the Taliban and the other Islamist movements fighting the Afghan government. We are still winning tactically, but we may well be losing strategically."

Cordesman, the Center for Strategic and International Studies' strategic thinker, added, "Winning will take more resources, more forces, more patience and at least five to 10 more years of persistent effort."

In the light of the Congressional debates over Iraq, and the reticence of America's NATO allies to provide more troops for Afghanistan, Musharraf and his ISI analysts have concluded the West's will to win won't last the required five-to-10 years. Hence, the Pakistani leader's belief, denials notwithstanding, that a "moderate" Taliban regime in Kabul is a safer strategic bet.

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