In February 2009 a report issued by the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction titled "Hard Lessons: the Iraq Reconstruction Experience" described massive waste, fraud and a lack of accountability in the $50 billion relief and reconstruction project in Iraq, most of it done by private U.S. contractors.

At that time, the report's senior author, Stuart Bowen, suggested that many of the same mistakes will likely occur again in Afghanistan because none of the substantive changes in oversight and contracting or personnel assignments that the U.S. Congress, auditors and outside experts proposed for Iraq have been implemented in Afghanistan.

The price tag for training the ANP is $6 billion and counting. So, what exactly has been the return on this investment?

As described in a Newsweek and ProPublica report, less than 12 percent of the ANP units are capable of operating on their own, 90 percent of recruits are illiterate, 15 percent test positive for drug use and only 25 percent of the current 98,000 ANP force has received any formal training. Of the roughly 170,000 Afghans trained under the program, only about 30,000 remain.

In the worst-case scenario, members of the ANP have been reported to have sold their ammunition to the Taliban. Even Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the State Department's top representative in the region, has called the ANP "an inadequate organization, riddled with corruption."

If the ANP is riddled with corruption, then our side is apparently riddled with incompetence.

Since the Department of State first engaged Virginia defense contractor DynCorp International to assist in training the ANP in 2003, errors in contract management and weaknesses in contractor accounting procedures appear to have been frequent.

According to a joint Department of State and Department of Defense report "Interagency Assessment of Afghan Police Training and Readiness", as of May 2006, funding for the ANP program was about $1.1 billion for the period 2004-07. Almost all of that funding went to the contract with DynCorp.

In September 2004, barely one year after the initial DynCorp contract to train the ANP, allegations were made against DynCorp's Worldwide Personal Protective services in Afghanistan. The official investigation found no indications of fraud and mismanagement in DynCorp's operations, but it did note instances of poor accounting. The main conclusion of the Department of State report was poor contractor oversight by its own contracting officers, permitting $950,000 of erroneous or duplicate billing after an examination of a $17 million limited sample of contractor expenses, all of which the contractor agreed to reimburse.

According to the Newsweek article, a recent government audit of ANP training identified a total of $322 million in invoices that had been "approved even though they were not allowable, allocable, or reasonable" with half of the invoices containing errors.

None of this, however, is new. Operation Iraqi Freedom had comparable pain points.

An inspector general's report of Jan. 30, 2007 entitled Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 0338, for the Iraqi Police Training Program Support was consistent with the results of other investigations.

It concluded that "weak and sometimes non-existent contract administration was the root cause of the problems we identified with work performed under Task Order 0338."

One of the recommendations was to "seek reimbursement from DynCorp of the improperly authorized payment of $4.2 million that represents contractually unauthorized work directed by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. This work included the relocation of the residential camp, the manufacture of additional VIP trailers, and the construction of an Olympic size swimming pool."

As early as December 2005, a Department of State asset verification report from Iraq stated that "DynCorp invoices were frequently ambiguous and lacked the level of detail necessary to determine what was procured," "did not maintain a complete list of items procured" and "did not establish policy guidelines or accountability procedures." The report concluded that the government couldn't determine if it received what it paid for.

Despite a history of alleged contractual difficulties, the chief executive officer recently told investors that DynCorp will continue to train the ANP at least through July. DynCorp maintains that has "diligently fulfilled the requirements" of operating Afghan National Police training centers while developing and implementing police training programs, and "has won praise for its efforts from senior U.S. government officials."

Reached for comment, an official representative for DynCorp also noted: "There are three elements that are central to designing a successful police training program in Afghanistan. First, roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined at the outset so that both government and contractors fully understand the goals and metrics by which success will be measured. Second, government should provide oversight that is aligned to the mission in order that professional and capable contractors like DynCorp International can achieve the appropriate results. Third, the contract process should provide a fair playing field for all bidders, so that government can achieve the best value by choosing the most qualified contractor with the least transition risk."

The ongoing controversy regarding the ANP program could all be just shrugged off as typical government ineptitude and the comfortable relationships that can develop between contractors and contracting officers.

This would be so, if the effectiveness of the ANP was not a key element of the "hold" and "build" components of the "clear, hold and build" counterinsurgency strategy.

U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, who took over in November as chief of the U.S. program to expand and improve Afghanistan's security forces, has noted that it is easier to work with military personnel or national police forces than with contractors. He may be on to something.

Unless one is prepared to be thoroughly aware of the statement of work and the terms and conditions of the contracts, while vigorously monitoring contractor performance and accounting, the problems of the past will continue into the future.

Sadly, the disaster that is the ANP program wasn't only predictable, it was preventable.

(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D., is a colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and a veteran of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army or government.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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