Overseas commitments with long duration and the loss of many lives and many casualties have put a strain on personnel.

Qualification and motivation of personnel must -- due to QDR 2006 -- be enhanced through the recruitment of well-trained, highly motivated "joint war fighters" and civilian "nation builders" who possess language skills, information technology skills and cultural awareness.

QDR 2006 makes it clear that U.S. forces have to be capable of fighting in "irregular warfare" as well as in traditional and conventional "high intensity warfare" -- even though "irregular warfare" seems to be the more likely now.

Therefore, U.S. forces have to be both "light" and "heavy" to meet different challenges. But all fights have to be "joint and combined" based on further developed "network centric warfare" capabilities in C4 ISR. This system should allow "massing the impact" instead of massing the troops. "Massing the impact" includes the nuclear option, "which remains a keystone of U.S. national power."

QDR 2006 asks for more "jointness" in weapons procurement and equipment. There is no longer the need for all services to be able to fight on their own, if and when "jointness" is the new strategic "law."

One assessment is certainly correct that the phrase "one size fits all" is no longer true. The United States must have more tailored capabilities to deter -- and if deterrence fails -- "to defeat advanced military powers, regional WMD states, or non-state terrorism."

As the crystal ball does not offer a clear assessment of the future threat, U.S. forces can no longer be "threat based" but instead have to be "capability based." But the emerging capabilities no longer allow U.S. forces to fight and win two parallel "major conventional operations."

QDR 2006 addresses the issue of the force stationing posture. A balance must be found between the permanent stationing of U.S. forces and materiel abroad and stationing at home. In this question, strategic transport plays a vital role.

"Prevent, deter and defeat" remain the three basic tasks acknowledging that deterrence and denial have a different meaning in "irregular warfare" and in "asymmetric warfare." There is no doubt that preemptive strikes are valid options: "At the operational level, the United States must be able to prevent or disrupt adversaries' ability to plan and execute operations rather than being forced to respond to attacks after they have occurred."

QDR 2006 demands "principles of transparency, constructive competition to encourage innovation, agility and adaptability, collaboration and partnership and a shift of emphasis to meet the new strategic environment."

QDR 2006 addresses -- based upon the experience in Iraq -- a sensitive issue: The readiness and individual qualifications in many other antioanl or international agencies do not meet the standards that well-trained, "battle-hardened" military HQ and soldiers meet on short notice. QDR 2006 asks for the "unity of effort for complex interagency operations abroad," because: "The United States will not win the war on terrorism or achieve other crucial national security objectives ... by military alone."

This is in my view a crucial issue for any operation abroad -- be it the United Nations, NATO, the European Union or any "Coalition of the Willing." There is no equivalent "civil corps" that is well trained and capable for any quick reaction. Soldiers often have to take over missions they are not trained for.

QDR 2006 is correct in demanding an organization that can fill this gap that causes setbacks in nation building from the beginning of any operation. There is no clear cut between conflict and post-conflict operations. There has to be an overlapping effort as early as possible.

When it comes to the resources that the U.S. government and governments of other countries put into their defense budgets, I have a feeling of great envy from a German perspective. The U.S. defense budget is about 20 times higher than the German defense budget.

In spite of this huge amount of money, QDR 2006 asks for more efficiency and the deletion of unnecessary redundancies. My experience tells me that under the label of "jointness," any force planning has to follow a top-down approach to overcome the special interests of the services. It's a waste of money, time and effort if and when the planning follows a bottom-up approach.

This is easier said than done. There is a lot of old thinking. To meet the requests made in QDR 2006, the political and military leadership need strong nerves -- parallel to the ongoing military operations abroad.

Dieter Farwick is Global Editor-in-Chief of the Munich-based World Security Network. This article is reprinted by permission of WSN. United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.

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