The recent diplomatic maneuvering was marked by drama and near farce. An effort by the small Persian Gulf state of Qatar to hold a summit of all Arab states and Iran, as well as Syria-based Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, was challenged by Saudi Arabia, which attempted to host its own gathering. Instead, on Jan. 19 a long-scheduled Arab economic meeting in Kuwait was transformed into a full-scale Arab summit.

Historically, Arab summits are dominated by Egypt, the oldest Arab state, and Saudi Arabia, the self-proclaimed leader of the Islamic world and, by virtue of its huge oil reserves, the richest Arab state. But this order has been challenged by tiny, gas-rich Qatar, hugely wealthy in per capita terms, and by Syria, regional troublemaker and close ally of (non-Arab) Iran. A surprise reconciliation lunch hosted by Saudi King Abdullah for his ally President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and his antagonists Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani of Qatar and President Bashar Assad of Syria broke the deadlock. Even so, the summit ended with scant mention of the Gaza crisis and Hamas in the final communique.

Since the breakdown of the 2000 Camp David peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab leaders have differed over how to deal with the Palestinian issue. In one camp, Syria supports the "resistance" activities of the Iranian-backed groups Hezbollah and Hamas. In the other, U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Egypt support the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative -- a Saudi proposal calling for a full Israeli withdrawal from lands it occupied in 1967 and an "agreed" resolution of the refugee issue in exchange for full Arab recognition of and normalization of ties with Israel.

Divisions between the two camps widened following the February 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, a dual Saudi-Lebanese citizen and the kingdom's chief supporter in Lebanon. In the aftermath of the slaying, Saudi Arabia and Egypt led a diplomatic boycott of Damascus, whose security services were a leading suspect in the murder.

In a bid to rein in Syrian and Iranian influence following Hamas' victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections, Saudi Arabia in February 2007 brokered a power-sharing accord in Mecca between Fatah and Hamas. To cement the deal, Saudi Arabia invited Syria's Assad to the March 2007 "Arab Solidarity Summit" in Riyadh. While the summit began with photos of King Abdullah and Assad walking together holding hands, it ended in discord when Assad tried to add new language to the Arab Peace Initiative. Three months later, in June 2007, Hamas seized power in Gaza through armed force.

Tensions between Riyadh and Damascus worsened over the standoff to select a new Lebanese president, ending in Hezbollah's May 2008 temporary armed takeover of West Beirut. Adding insult to Riyadh's injury, Qatar's Sheik Hamad brokered a deal to elect a Lebanese president and to ensure a "blocking third" of opposition ministers in the ruling Cabinet (effectively giving them a veto), solving the Lebanese standoff on Hezbollah and Syria's terms.

Despite the kisses and hand-holding at the Kuwait summit, the diplomatic game apparently continues. Qatar was probably encouraged by the near success of the meeting it organized in Doha -- 13 Arab heads of state were present, just one short of a quorum, plus Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. That meeting's final communique called for Arab countries to "suspend the Arab Peace Initiative" and to "cease all forms of normalization with Israel, including a reconsideration of diplomatic and economic relations." Indeed, Qatar closed the Israeli trade mission in Doha, and Mauritania broke relations with Israel.

King Abdullah's threat to withdraw his peace plan is probably an attempt to avoid being outflanked by other Arab rulers. In his tough speech to the Kuwait meeting (carried on the Web site of the Saudi Embassy in Japan), Abdullah, perceived in the West as a moderate, referred to the "treacherous Israeli enemy" and the "genocide (in Gaza)" being carried out by "a criminal, inhuman and merciless gang."

The spirit of compromise displayed by the Arab rivals at their luncheon was not matched by their respective delegations, which were left to write the final communique. According to various diplomatic and media reports, differences arose after Qatar and Syria pushed for reference to the Doha communique's call to suspend the Arab Peace Initiative and an unconditional opening of all crossings into Gaza (perhaps under Turkish and EU monitoring). Saudi Arabia and Egypt vehemently opposed the Doha language, and instead demanded references to the Egyptian initiative to end violence in Gaza in which the Palestinian Authority would man Gaza's crossings. Equally controversial were disagreements over whether Arab assistance to Gaza would be delivered through Hamas or the Palestinian Authority.

The turmoil in Arab diplomacy presents both challenges and opportunities for the United States. On Gaza, Washington should continue to support the Egyptian initiative, which calls for the monitoring of Gaza crossings by the Palestinian Authority and greater Egyptian and international efforts to shut down tunnel smuggling networks. The United States should also work to ensure that Arab aid is delivered via the Palestinian Authority, allowing Hamas to gain as little credit as possible during reconstruction. The Saudi-authored Arab Peace Initiative could still provide a diplomatic building block in the peace process, but was already suffering from a lack of Saudi commitment to propel it forward.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are Washington's strongest Arab allies, but both Mubarak and Abdullah are old men, and the leadership transition in both countries could be problematic. Having the status of these leaders challenged by other countries does not help. Of the main antagonists Syria and Qatar, each presents a different problem. While the United States, at least under the Bush administration, was determined to curtail the influence of Syria, particularly in Lebanon, Qatar is an ally, providing air-base facilities and storage sites for military equipment.

Qatar's diplomatic stance has long been complex, as it tries to balance ties with the United States and Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Despite what often appears as deliberate provocation, Washington most likely will be careful not to irritate Qatar. Worryingly, though, the Qataris appear to have concluded that the U.S. status in the region is declining while Iran's is ascending, and that Tehran therefore should be accommodated as necessary.

(Andrew Tabler is Soref fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Simon Henderson is Baker fellow and director of the Washington Institute's Gulf and Energy program.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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