This attitude has made the insistence of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that U.S. forces fully exit Iraq over the next couple of years much easier to accept. But it also involves an attitude of scolding and punishing the Iraqis for their failures -- and there have certainly been many of them.

However, this view leaves out of the equation the fundamental question as to how the U.S. national interest is best served, regardless of what the Iraqi people and their armed forces and government do or do not do efficiently.

The U.S. government could very well send "messages" to the Iraqis and then feel good about the fact that, before leaving, at least it had tried. This attitude could be expressed in the phrase: "We really hoped that they would shape up, but, alas, they did not. So, in good conscience, we did what we had to do and left. So there."

This kind of approach, of course, assumes that it is entirely reasonable to expect that the first Iraqi Parliament and democratic coalition government to be elected in Iraq in the nearly half a century since the toppling of the Hashemite monarchy and its ramshackle but certainly democratic constitutional system in the bloody military coup of 1958 will have acquired the maturity, the sophistication, the capacity and the expertise to behave according to the standards of modern day liberal democracies.

Maliki's government, against so many pessimistic expectations, has made serious progress towards restoring law, order and functioning society in most of Iraq. And while they are clearly falling short in some areas, their achievements after two and a half years of Gen. David Petraeus' "surge" counterinsurgency strategy is now undeniable to any unbiased observer.

The ultimate viability of the more than 530,000 Iraqi security forces after U.S. forces fully withdraw has, of course, yet to be fully tested. In the past, the Iraqi security forces have repeatedly had to fall back on the professionalism and effectiveness of U.S. forces to roll back their opponents.

This has created a widespread attitude among Americans of skepticism about the ultimate effectiveness of any Iraqi security force to effectively maintain law and order in their own country without the U.S. Army and Marines being there to back them up.

Part 5: Calibrating an effective transition from U.S. to Iraqi control of security

(Paolo Liebl von Schirach is the editor of SchirachReport.com, a regular contributor to Swiss radio and an international economic-development expert.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

earlier related report
Gates hits back at critics of Obama's top security advisor
Washington (AFP) June 9, 2009
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has hit back at critics of US President Barack Obama's national security advisor, saying the former Marine general deserved praise instead of "sniping" over his performance.

Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said Gates took the unusual step of requesting an interview with a Washington Post columnist to respond to criticism from unnamed officials against James Jones, the retired general who serves as Obama's national security advisor.

He gave the interview to the Post's David Ignatius "because the secretary firmly believes, as he articulated to Mr. Ignatius, that General Jones is doing a terrific job," Morrell said on Monday.

"And there is, as you all are no doubt aware, a lot of chatter in Washington about the job that he is doing," he said.

The Washington Post on Sunday quoted Gates praising Jones, saying the general sought to ensure the president heard a range of views from all the key players on an issue instead of trying to skew discussions.

"I can trust Jim to represent my views on an issue to the president.... He is a facilitator, not an obstacle, and that hasn't always been true in that job," Gates told the Post.

"I think of Jim as the glue that holds this team together," Gates added.

Due to Jones's management, the top foreign policy and national security figures in the administration were "not a team of rivals, but a team," said Gates, a former CIA director who has worked for US presidents dating back to the 1970s.

Unnamed sources have criticized Jones in US media reports, alleging that he is unprepared, marginalized in White House deliberations and working relatively short hours.

Gates "felt strongly enough that he wanted to be on the record as a guy who knows a lot about how the NSC (National Security Council) works and has worked with a great many national security advisers over the course of his career as saying that, in his estimation, at this point, Jones is up there with the best he's worked with," Morrell said.

Morrell acknowledged that Gates's move was "unusual" but that it was justified "based upon how General Jones was being treated."

He added that Jones has been subject to "sniping and undercutting" in the press.

In his interview with the Post, Gates acknowledged that he and Jones and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are older than some members of the White House staff and do not enjoy the kind of close personal ties to Obama as veterans of the president's election campaign.

"Age difference and closeness [to Obama] are a reality, but I don't sense antagonism or jealousy," Gates said.

earlier related report
Outside View: Leaving Iraq -- Part 5
U.S. President Barack Obama's determination to evacuate all U.S. combat forces from Iraq in fact is only fulfilling a commitment made by his predecessor, President George W. Bush, in 2008.

Bush was highly reluctant to make the commitment, and Obama was eager to do so. But both were, in fact, forced to make that decision because of the insistence of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that a deadline for the evacuation of all U.S. combat forces from his country had to be imposed.

However, Obama's determination to implement that policy has been made far easier because of a widespread consensus attitude spreading from right to left across the U.S. domestic political spectrum.

This attitude can be expressed the following way: "The Iraqi people and their government are clearly falling short in their abilities to maintain law, order and security in their country without continual hands-on support from the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines after a couple of 'tough love' attempts that did not work. Therefore, clearly the American people and the United States government should accept the evidence of the Iraqis' terminal failure to deliver. As time and again the Iraqi government and their security forces have proven to be unable to shape up, the U.S. armed forces will have to leave."

So according to this attitude, the U.S. armed forces will be leaving Iraq because the American people and their government flunked the bad student. This will teach him a lesson. Right?

Unfortunately, here we are not in school. There may not be other opportunities for the unfocused Iraqis to concentrate and take the test again. Most Americans have not considered the likelihood that the Iraqis did not "shape up" in the past because, given the infancy of their political institutions and the government they formed, they were not yet capable. And the fact remains that, since the highly successful counterinsurgency policies of Gen. David Petraeus were implemented, the Maliki government and its 630,000-strong police and army forces have proven far more effective in establishing their mandate of control over most of their own country.

It is a very easy job for the critics to point out all the failures of the Maliki government. But, after American and other critics have fixed the blame and thus can feel good about their choices based on undeniably reasonable standards, if applied to ordinary circumstances, can they really say that they have fixed the problem?

There are dangers for Americans to indulge the fantasy that they are "teaching a lesson" to the immature Iraqis by blaming them for the many security failures in their country over the past six years. Fixating on that attitude can blind Americans to the key factors that should shape U.S. policy in America's own national self-interest.

Part 6: Defining the most important U.S. national interest for staying in Iraq

(Paolo Liebl von Schirach is the editor of SchirachReport.com, a regular contributor to Swiss radio and an international economic-development expert.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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