Iran will continue to build-up its capabilities for asymmetric warfare, but be careful to limit their use unless it feels threatened or its sees a major opportunity.

The good news is that many aspects of the belief structure of Iran's new president and Majlis are so socially and economically impractical that they may eventually lead to a change in the character of the regime. The bad new is that in the short run, more pressure on the United States, Israel, and Iran's neighbors are likely, as are and more resulting adventures.

There is some chance of a serious escalation of Sunni and Shi'ite tensions that could lead to an more aggressive Iran. One way or another, Iraq is certain to have Iranian involvement. Any form of federalism that created an Iraqi Shi'ite enclave that felt dependent on Iran could make this much worse, as could the expansion of Shi'ite Islamist influence in Iraq. The Sunni-Shi'ite splits in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen are other potential friction points.

As for military developments over the next two decades, it is hard to look more than five to 10 years in the future. Iran will conduct force modernization, although it seems likely to emphasize proliferation and asymmetric warfare.

Its air force continues to age - although there are new reports of aircraft purchases from Russia and it has bought more modern air munitions. Its surface-based air defense system is a patchwork quilt of obsolescence. It has reconditioned some of its major surface ships, but with mixed results.

The conventional capabilities of its land forces have never been fully rebuilt since its devastating defeats in the spring and summer of 1988. Only 480 of its some 1,600 tanks are T-72s, and these are both vulnerable and have significant operating problems.

At this point in time, it seems to be relying on its nascent defense industries to produce modern tanks, AFVs, and artillery, but its future success is very unpredictable.

If one looks at Iranian arms buys in recent years, Iran did order $1,900 million worth of new arms agreements in 1997-2000, but only $500 million worth in 2001-2004. The end total of $2.3 billion is probably less than half of what was needed to recapitalize and modernize its present force structure. It compares with a total of $54.7 billion for Saudi and $11.6 billion for a small Gulf country like the United Arab Emirates.

Syria's main goal will be to defend and preserve its present Alawite-dominated regime. It will compromise and retreat whenever it seems desirable to do so to achieve this goal. Syria, however, cannot help playing games over the Golan, Lebanon, and Iraq. It will not perceive its interests as those of the United States or its allies. It may be bribable; its behavior cannot be change through persuasion or threats.

As for military developments over the next two decades, Syria badly needs to modernize almost every aspect of its force structure. Its air force, surface-to-air forces, and much of its navy now have limited operational capability. Its electronic warfare capability and command and control systems are aged in military terms and highly vulnerable to Israel or U.S. attack/suppression.

Syria lacks the leadership and experience it had in 1973 and 1982, and much of its military has become a corrupt garrison force in the years of peace that have followed. In spite of more than a decade of effort, it has not been able to get anything like the arms deliveries it has sought from Russia - although report after report has been issued indicating it has found ways to arrange such financing.

If one looks at Syrian arms buys in recent years, Syria only ordered $500 million worth of new arms agreements in 1997-2000, and $300 million worth in 2001-2004. The end total of $800 million is probably less than 25 percent of what was needed to recapitalize and modernize its present force structure and compares with $9.7 billion for Egypt and $8.4 billion for Israel.

(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the CSIS. This article is extracted with permission from his testimony on Sept. 28, 2005 to the Middle East and Africa Threat Panel of the House Armed Services Committee.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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