The NSG is an informal cartel made up of 40 nations that work together to coordinate and control the trade of nuclear reactor technology and 'dual-use' materials. More specifically, the NSG forbids its members from trading with nations that do not adopt "full-scope" International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over their entire nuclear program.

The United States non-proliferation bureaucracy played an active role in supporting China's bid to join the NSG. In a hearing on May 18, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf told the House International Relations committee that by the 1990s, China began "taking a more serious approach to nonproliferation issues" and that the U.S. began a long-term dialogue with the Asian giant which promised China more nuclear co-operation in return for stronger export control laws. Wolf told Congressmen that in the State Department's view, China's progress since then has been sufficient enough to warrant strong U.S. support for moves like China's joining of the NSG.

Unfortunately, this a short-sighted move that once again betrays an unwillingness to learn from history on the part of American non-proliferation bureaucracy.

Just days before it formally joined the NSG, China finalized a deal with Pakistan to build a 300 megawatt nuclear reactor. This is especially galling because China knew that it could not trade nuclear technology with Pakistan after it joined the group. What makes this more appalling is that China concluded this hasty deal even as Pakistan's role in the A.Q.Khan nuclear scandal, which is perhaps the worst nuclear proliferation scandal in history, was unraveling.

China itself was implicated in the same scandal with indisputable evidence of its transfer of a nuclear warhead design, with detailed manufacturing instructions, partly in Chinese, to Pakistan, in direct violation of its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty commitment. The 25 Kiloton Chinese implosion device design freely circulated within the A.Q.Khan network and there is no telling which other countries and more ominously, which terrorist groups managed to acquire the warhead design.

Nuclear weapons expert David Albright has stated that this Chinese bomb design would be ideal for a terrorist nuke that could fit in a pickup truck. In the wake of this embarrassing and deadly revelation, one would think that China would be circumspect in its dealings with its proliferation partner, Pakistan. Instead, China's decision to conclude a reactor deal with Pakistan now betrays the nation's lack of respect for multilateral restraint regimes and shows a willingness to thumb its nose at the rest of the world.

The claim that China started taking non-proliferation seriously since the 1990s also does not bear scrutiny. In 1992, the U.S. slapped sanctions on Chinese firms for delivering M-11 ballistic missile components to Pakistan.

After a written assurance from China to stick to Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, the sanctions were lifted. Nine months after the waiver, the Los Angeles Times quoted U.S. intelligence officials as stating that China had delivered about around 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan through the port of Karachi, making a mockery of its earlier pledge.

In 1996, after obtaining clear evidence of the sale of 5,000 ring magnets, critical Uranium enrichment components, to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, American non-proliferation bureaucrats bailed out China yet again by refusing to make a "determination" whether China violated its NPT commitments. For the rest of the world however, the ring magnets sale was a clear breach of Article III (2) of the NPT.

And there is no sign of improvement in China's behavior yet. The 2004 Annual report to the Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes that "Continuing intelligence reports indicate that Chinese cooperation with Pakistan and Iran remains an integral element of China's foreign policy."

This view fits in well with the actual Chinese actions, which are aimed to create nuclear and ballistic missile armed regional troublemakers like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to both keep the U.S. occupied as well as to stymie China's local rivals like Japan and India, while China builds itself economically.

The report also debunks the notion that the proliferation happens without the knowledge of top Chinese officials by pointing out many of the proliferating Chinese companies, which are state owned, have direct ties to top-level government and military officials. Former Secretary of State James A. Baker noted in his memoirs that top Chinese officials partook in the profits from nuclear and missile proliferation by government owned Chinese companies.

Another red-herring is the issue of "export controls." State Department officials have prided themselves in their ability to help China supposedly shore up its export controls by working with the Asian behemoth to come with lists of what can and cannot be sold to other nations.

But given that government owned companies with ties to top Chinese officials are the ones proliferating, reducing China's problems to one of bureaucratic regulations is like working with the mob to write laws to regulate itself.

Within a totalitarian regime like China, government laws are meaningless and can be broken if top officials want to do so. Given this, framing the Chinese proliferation issue as one of export controls, instead of intent, flies in the face of facts.

By seeing an American willingness to repeatedly believe their bad-faith promises and eagerness to bail them out when they renege, Chinese leaders only get to draw one lesson -- that they can reap the benefits of belonging to multilateral nuclear regimes while being able to selectively break its commitments with impunity.

In the May 18 Congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary Wolf told lawmakers that the U.S. has not even seen the contract that China recently signed with Pakistan. What is the State Department likely to do should China try to pass more nuclear weapons aid to Pakistan under the cover of the reactor deal?

Unfortunately, China's entry into the NSG is likely to turn into a Trojan Horse that could only serve to further undermine global non-proliferation efforts.

(Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on terror and non-proliferation.)

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