This criticism, however, betrays irritation at new political realities, both on a regional and the global level. It has to deal with the fact that resurgent Russia actively pursues an independent policy aimed at preventing Iran from going nuclear and at the same time giving Iran an opportunity to develop its nuclear energy program under strict international control.

It will hardly be an exaggeration to say that the future of Iran's nuclear program is currently hinged on its acceptance of the Russian proposal to provide uranium enrichment services for Iran's program on Russian territory. This is not an alternative, but rather a complement to international efforts spearheaded by the Europeans and International Atomic Energy Authority since the prerequisite for the Russian plan is the immediate suspension of all enrichment-related activity on Iranian soil.

The plan appears to be a sensible compromise that would benefit both parties -- and the world. Russia would benefit economically and politically. Iran would have an opportunity to back down from the confrontation with the West gracefully. The world would have the Iranian nuclear program under control and prevent the further expansion of "the nuclear club". Let us call it Plan "A."

Unfortunately, Iran continues to send conflicting signals as to whether it finds this plan acceptable. The latest round of talks between Russia and Iran in Moscow did not bring any result. The talks are due to be continued in Tehran last week, but Russia is unlikely to go any further than it already did. The Russian news agency "Novosti" quoted an unnamed source at the Federal Nuclear Energy Agency as saying that the Russian delegation will not put forward any new proposals on uranium enrichment at the next round of talks.

This poses a question -- what will be Russia's policy if Iran dumps its plan? Most probably Russia will support the United Nations Security Council in fairly quickly issuing a statement from its president that would reiterate the conclusions of the IAEA Board of Governors. It would signify a broadening of the efforts to get Iran to change its mind. This could become Plan "B." There certainly may be other plans -- "C," "D," and so on. But exactly how far would Russia be prepared to go?

Under certain circumstances, Russia could go far enough and play an important role in all the attempts to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Quite opposite to what some critics say, Russian cooperation with the United States on Iran could become a driving force of significant improvement of Russian-American relations and revitalize the non-proliferation regime.

There are at least three major ways to contest this argument.

First, one may argue that Russia has considered Iran to be a very good market for its nuclear energy and arms export. Taking a fatalistic view on non-proliferation (India and Pakistan went nuclear anyway), Russia may decide that it is not going to lose all those lucrative deals for the sake of an unrealistic goal of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran.

Second, critics may point out that there are powerful forces within the Russian elite that are reluctant to give up their current interests to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran in the future.

Third, Russia seeks to restore its status as a major global player. Therefore, some would allege, it would not like to bend under Western pressure and is likely to take an intransigent position.

However, analysis reveals the skewed nature of these arguments. The first argument, namely Iran being a valuable trade partner to Russia, was stronger five or six years ago than it is now. Iran's share in Russia's trade turnover has been on a steady decline and is currently less than one percent. Besides, Russia is not cash-strapped today, a stark difference with the situation several years ago.

The second argument does not take into account the changes in the Russian elite. Under President Vladimir Putin, special interest groups have been reined in. Also, some members of the Russian elite consider Iran to be a Russian competitor in oil and gas as well as in the struggle for regional influence. As for the third argument, it is too simplistic.

Russia's goals in the world arena are much more complex and sophisticated than showing off its re-acquired grandeur. President Putin wants Russia to be a competitive modern country that is fully accepted by the most prestigious clubs like the Group of Eight major industrialized nations, or G8, of which Russia is this year's president. He unequivocally stated that the isolation of Russia would be a major threat to Russia's national security.

Thus we see that the Kremlin can throw its weight on the side of the United States and Europe. It can sacrifice economic interests -- and it will not kill the Russian economy. It can curb special interests -- and it will not undermine Putin's authority. It can try to form an alliance with the West on this particular issue - and it will not contradict its long-tem foreign policy goals.

The question is whether Russia will be willing to do all that. The evidence suggests that it will, but this is where the "if" comes in.

First, Russia will be with the United States if there is a strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy as opposed to the military option which Russia considers to be very dangerous, counterproductive, and ultimately ineffective.

Second, Russia must be fully integrated as a stakeholder, not a junior partner, into the international system. Some analysts argue that the US should be more attentive to Russian interests in the post-Soviet space or become less critical on Russia's record in the field of democratic transition in order to secure its cooperation on Iran.

This is not likely to work. Small carrots were acceptable to Russia ten years ago. Since then, Russia turned into a proud, confident, and economically booming country. Vague promises to consider its interests are not nearly enough. Russia strives for a prominent, independent, and respectable role in the new system of international relations.

Both Moscow and Washington want a non-nuclear Iran. To achieve this goal, both countries must consider non-proliferation as a priority - a priority that is important enough for Russia to challenge a regional ally and trading partner, and for the United States to work within a multilateral framework and think about giving security guarantees to Iran. Both countries should work hard to not let their disagreements elsewhere jeopardize their cooperation on preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. This is an entirely realistic scenario -- provided realism dominates on both sides.

Dr. Igor Zevelev is Washington bureau chief of the Russian News and Information Agency "Novosti". Kirill Glebov is his deputy. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.

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