"You must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone."

There is no better time than now to heed his advice as the United States formulates a new strategy to stabilize Iraq.

The U.S. Department of the Army's new Field Manual, or FM 3-24, defines a counterinsurgency campaign as a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, conducted along multiple lines of operation. To regain the initiative from the insurgents, the counterinsurgent strategy needs to focus on stability operations.

U.S. Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05 published on Nov. 28, 2005, describes stability operations as "military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions."

The immediate goal of stability operations is to provide the local populace with security, to restore essential services and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to create the basis for, not guarantee, indigenous capacity to secure a viable market economy, to maintain the rule of law, to establish democratic institutions, and to facilitate a robust civil society.

Stability operations require the ability to shape the environment -- that is, to separate the insurgency from its base of support and operations, through the appropriate application of all instruments of national power, build capacity with local partners and integrate more effectively civilian-military operations through ongoing interagency and multinational collaboration.

Integrating civilian and military efforts is the key to successful stability operations. The military should be prepared to work and share information with relevant U.S. departments and agencies, coalition forces, global and regional international organizations and private sector companies. Unity of effort is required with centralized coordination, but decentralized execution working directly with reliable local leaders to help organize bottom-up security, reconstruction and economic development

To address the rapidly-adapting insurgent tactics, effective new technologies and methods need be rapidly identified, tested and fielded. Greater efforts should be made to simplify procurement procedures and enlist the expertise of the U.S. business community either directly or through highly skilled Reservists.

When military operations are required, they should be done in coordination with and, when appropriate, simultaneously with diplomatic, informational and economic efforts, focusing less on kinetics than on the desired effects. The effective use of force requires timely, actionable intelligence and real-time analytics by means of tailored and flexible military assets.

A likely future strategy will involve some version of the "clear, hold and build" or "spreading inkblot" approach, where islands of stability gradually expand and the nodes are connected to isolate the insurgents into ever smaller pockets of resistance. As FM 3-24 correctly notes, it is easier to cut off an insurgency and let it die than to kill every insurgent. An important element of this approach will be to isolate the insurgency from external support, particularly that coming from Iraq's meddlesome neighbors - another appropriate use of DIME.

At the time of this writing, reports are surfacing that President George W. Bush will order an increase in the number of American troops to be deployed to Iraq. The expectation is that it will lead to greater security. This, however, is only one step in the effort to create a stable environment in Iraq. Unless the increase in security is coupled with concomitant improvements in the quality of life for ordinary Iraqis, the strategy will fail. The resources and expertise must be in place to execute simultaneously all elements of national power, which are necessary for a successful outcome.

The question remains: will the United States deliver DIME or will the effort in Iraq again be short-changed?

(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D. is an Afghanistan veteran)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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