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Outside View: The case for JASSM
Washington (UPI) Oct 25, 2007 Theodore Gaillard's two-part critique of the U.S. cruise-missile arsenal does a disservice to the nation's armed forces and particularly to the war fighters who count on the capabilities of weapons such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. Gaillard cites two principal points to support his premise that further work on JASSM and other subsonic cruise missiles should be halted in favor of a supersonic missile -- a concept still in its earliest stages. One is that subsonic cruise missiles can easily be defeated by enemy air defenses. The other is that these weapons lack sufficient range to be of any real military utility. Both arguments are flawed. In developing requirements for the competitively procured JASSM, U.S. Air Force planners carefully balanced considerations such as cost, performance and reliability and determined that stealth was of paramount importance -- precisely to enhance the missile's survivability against a range of threats. Extensive testing and modeling has proven that JASSM's stealth capabilities work in extended flights against modern layered, networked air defense systems. Although, understandably, the details of this testing are classified, JASSM's stealth capabilities have never been questioned. It is true that the baseline JASSM, currently in production, has a range greater than 200 miles. But Gaillard neglected to mention that the Air Force and Lockheed Martin are working on several variants that will significantly extend the missile's range. The government-industry team also is pursuing other critical enhancements to JASSM, taking advantage of the missile's unique open architecture to incorporate new technologies as they become available. The spiral development process has not been without technical challenges and test failures. While disappointing to the thousands of talented men and women who work on the program, such setbacks are not unexpected -- particularly when one pushes the technology envelope to its limits, as we are doing with JASSM. Gaillard also conveniently neglected to remind his readers that the entire point of a rigorous test regime such as that to which JASSM has been subjected is to identify, isolate and correct problems that may be created as new capabilities are introduced. Contrary to the impression created by Gaillard, test failures do not mean the entire program is a failure; rather, they mean that the testing process works -- and that more work needs to be done. Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Air Force are doing just that. Government-industry technical teams have dissected data from test failures, identified root causes and developed corrective action plans that we have validated in a series of laboratory and field tests. We recently conducted successful ground tests that provide further confidence in the corrective actions. A high-level team of Air Force and Lockheed Martin executives is reviewing these results before flight tests resume. Lockheed Martin is sharing the cost of this effort and has committed to pay for the majority of any fixes that may be required to previously accepted missiles already in inventory. We have taken a similar collaborative approach in addressing the program's overall cost, which has grown in large part due to the numerous capability enhancements that have been added to JASSM since the contract for the original baseline missile was awarded. It is important to remember that, even now, JASSM is the lowest-cost cruise missile in the nation's arsenal. It is also the only cruise missile in the world to incorporate state-of-the-art stealth technologies. Without an understanding of just how well JASSM employs these extreme low-observable technologies -- knowledge that understandably is restricted -- one cannot fully appreciate what the missile can do for combatant commanders in the first critical days of a high-threat conflict. We are optimistic that our customer will be able to certify to the U.S. Congress in early 2008 that the JASSM cost and technical issues are under control and that the program should continue. Are we disappointed that the Air Force has found it necessary to identify potential alternatives to JASSM? Absolutely. But we also understand that the service is doing exactly what any prudent buyer would do. In fact, Lockheed Martin follows exactly the same process with its own suppliers. We recognize that many competitors and the critics who support them would like to see JASSM fail. Lockheed Martin's JASSM team is determined to frustrate them. Most important, we are committed to continuing to work closely with the Air Force to deliver a system that our nation's war fighters can rely on to take out the most critical targets in the harshest environments.
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
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India test fires nuclear-capable missile New Delhi (AFP) Oct 24, 2007 India on Wednesday test fired its nuclear-capable Agni-1 ballistic missile for the second time in less than a month and said the latest experiment was a "major success." |
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