The new system will be tested later this year during annual joint military exercises known as the Ulchi Freedom Guardian drills.

The transfer of wartime command has been controversial. The previous government under President Roh Moo-hyun supported it in the interest of strengthening South Korean self-defense, and the United States has also favored it in pursuit of "strategic flexibility" for its troops.

However, the decision poses serious challenges to national-security strategy, and its full import has not been carefully contemplated. It has also involved critical misunderstandings concerning the perceived infringement of South Korean sovereignty, possible security risks beyond the government's control and the impact on South Korea's efforts to secure its strategic position within the Northeast Asian multinational security regime that is expected to be set up after the six-party negotiations on North Korea come to an end.

There seems to be no turning back with regard to the handover process, however; it will be completed by 2012 as scheduled.

Is it a violation of South Korean sovereignty if the CFC head holds wartime command? Does it detract from the country's right to self-defense? In fact, wartime command is a device designed to safeguard the nation's sovereignty rather than a part of the sovereignty to be protected.

Wartime operational command has been held by the head of U.N. military headquarters since the end of the Korean War. Even though at that time the South Korean president had no say in military operations, the situation did not cause a constitutional violation of sovereignty. No matter how hurtful it may have been to South Korean national pride to rely on outside forces, it was a legitimate choice for protecting the country's independence and sovereignty.

The important thing is not the legal right to conduct self-defense but the real capacity to do so. In the international arena, pure self-defense that rejects any form of interdependence between countries would be almost unsustainable because of the burden of military costs and the tendency toward competitive increases in military spending between adversaries.

An alliance spreads military spending among partner countries and allows them to invest more in economic growth and domestic affairs. This is the case in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S.-Japan alliance.

South and North Korea both have high military costs because of their mutual distrust and their competition for superior military status. The South Korea-U.S. alliance has effectively mitigated South Korea's burden and exerted a deterrent effect on North Korea.

Therefore, it is wise to acknowledge the necessity of a military alliance in which partner countries combine their rights and authority and find a balance between independent sovereignty and interdependent alliance.

It is not a violation of South Korean sovereignty if the CFC head holds wartime command, as he cannot exercise it unilaterally. His authority is backed up by the presidents of South Korea and the United States, as well as the Security Consultative Meeting and Military Committee Meeting. This is guaranteed by Article 2 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

Infringement of South Korean sovereignty could occur only if the United States neglected its obligation to consult with South Korea and proceeded with military action alone. Considering the deep-rooted trust between the two countries and the binding force of their treaty, this is very unlikely.

If the joint command ceases to exist as a result of the transfer of wartime command, the roles of the allies will change significantly. South Korea will take the leading role in military operations and the United States will cease to take the initiative. South Korea will also lose the guarantee of automatic U.S. military intervention in case of emergency.

Consequently, the South Korean government will impose on itself the new responsibility of securing a military surge in time of emergency. This responsibility is burdensome in that South Korea will have to persuade U.S. forces to intervene swiftly and actively if they are needed.

As long as the South Korea-U.S. alliance exists, the United States can be expected to provide military support. But the partial withdrawal of U.S. military forces means that South Korea cannot maintain the same level of military presence and deterrence over North Korea it has had so far. It will have to increase military spending to make up for the U.S. withdrawal.

These new burdens, along with weakened defense and deterrence, suggest that the transfer of wartime command is not a wise and economical option for South Korea.

The South Korean and U.S. governments seem to be pursuing the transfer based on mutual agreement, but their interests may diverge at a deeper level. South Korea wants to avert a unilateral U.S. action such as a pre-emptive strike on North Korea; the United States wants to realign its troops for greater "strategic flexibility," including a Rapid Deployment Force that can respond quickly to any crisis in the region.

North Korea does not currently hold nuclear weapons-state status, an international recognition granted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it obtained de facto recognition from the U.S. government early this year that it has several nuclear bombs on hand. This reinforces the U.S. desire for a Rapid Deployment Force that could launch a pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities without relying on conventional military operations.

The question remains whether South Korea's wartime command and the U.S. option for a pre-emptive strike on North Korea are compatible.

The transfer allows South Korea to take the initiative in military operations on the Korean peninsula and to take a leading position in the multinational security regime that is expected to replace the six-party talks as the body in charge of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

This will take some time; practical discussions on setting up the new regime can only take place when the nations in the six-party talks finalize the denuclearization process and deal with the security guarantee of North Korea.

Kim Jae Chang, chairman of the Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies, points out that South Korea is inviting North Korea to consider the strategic option of a sudden raid on the southern part of the Korean peninsula, which is less than 200 miles wide in some places. If North Korea threatens to play this card, it would put the six-party negotiations at risk and prevent the development of the multinational security regime.

Kim emphasizes that South Korea's goals must be to maintain the military status quo and simultaneously find a non-military way to induce North Korea to change. The South Korea-U.S. alliance is not an obstacle to this, he said.

Rather, the military status quo can prevent North Korea from military threats or actions on the Korean peninsula, while securing sufficient time to improve relations between the two Koreas. In this respect, the decision to transfer wartime command to South Korea can be seen as imprudent, in that it weakens the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

It is not the alliance that obstructs peace on the Korean peninsula, as some advocates of the transfer claim, but the obsolete perspective that the alliance is only a product of the Cold War. The post-Cold War era demands that the alliance be seen in a new light.

As Japan has discovered, any partner in an alliance with the United States increasingly confronts demands, both domestically and from the United States, to upgrade its status to a more equal partnership by investing more into the alliance in accordance with its internationally recognized economic status.

This demand for an upgraded alliance seems to require that South Korea take back wartime command from the Combined Forces Command. Still, the timing of the transfer seems to pose serious and unnecessary risks, based on South Korea's failure to objectively assess and verify its capacity to take command.

These problems originate from an underestimation of the usefulness of the South Korea-U.S. alliance in the context of current political and security realities.

To address the risks brought on by the transfer, South Korea must negotiate with the United States to guarantee a U.S. military surge in the event of an emergency and agree on specific guidelines with regard to any pre-emptive strike on North Korea.

South Korea and the United States are already moving toward transferring wartime operational command. Now it is time for them to re-evaluate their alliance from a new perspective, as a basis from which to pursue North Korean denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula.

-- (Lee Jae Young is legal assistant to the chairman of the Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies in Seoul. He has a master's degree from Cornell University Law School in Ithaca, New York. Copyright Lee Jae Young.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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