As resignation letters go, Hoh's was a masterpiece. In my opinion, many of his observations ring true, but one could offer alternative interpretations.

Terrorism directed against the United States and Western countries originates primarily from sanctuaries in failed, unstable or rogue states. That is, nations that either cannot constrain them or willingly tolerate them. In this respect, one needs to distinguish between potential bases of operations, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, and operational cells within target countries such as the United States, Spain and Britain. Groups like al-Qaida would not thrive very long in the latter unless we permitted them to do so.

Al-Qaida and the Taliban have provided a "rally point" for numerous other radical Islamic groups as well as Afghan or Pakistani tribal factions opposed to their central governments or the presence of foreign troops.

Hoh is correct in noting that many of the strategies the United States and NATO have attempted in Afghanistan have often produced the opposite of their intended effects. History and the cross-border tribal structure in Afghanistan and Pakistan should have taught us that a bottom-up strategy is probably more appropriate than a top-down approach based on Western views of governance and culture. In that regard, we might be better served using tribal rather than geographical maps.

We must also recognize that we are dealing with an evolving strategic and political situation. We should not base our judgments or plan future strategies using only past or present snapshots in time. We are not fighting the Taliban or al-Qaida of 2001. Both groups are now operating out of bases in western Pakistan precisely because the United States, coalition forces and indigenous Afghan factions such as the Northern Alliance pushed them out of Afghanistan. In the last eight years Western and Pakistani politico-military errors have contributed to a growth of the insurgency and instability in western Pakistan. One hastens to add, however, that the enemy gets a vote. Greater coordination among insurgent groups has varied based on their own self-interest and the operational environment.

According to his Washington Post interview, Hoh recommends that we "reduce our combat forces significantly with the ultimate aim of withdrawal in a year or two's time, reduce our development work, reverse the relationship of resources committed to Afghanistan and Pakistan, engage politically at the lowest level possible with Afghan leadership, to include Taliban and force Pakistan to remove the sanctuary offered to the Quetta shura in Pakistan."

It may be dangerous to assume that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would return us to the status quo ante of 2001. We could be facing a Taliban with far greater aspirations and an already entrenched insurgency in western Pakistan. Would abandoning Afghanistan encourage either Pakistan or the Taliban to disband the Quetta shura? Would such a strategy simply shift the U.S. and NATO effort across the Durand Line from Afghanistan into western Pakistan? One wonders.

Hoh states that "the Pashtun insurgency, which is composed of multiple seemingly infinite local groups … fights not for the white banner of the Taliban but against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul."

I have no reason to doubt his view, but it also sounds familiar. According to the U.S. Department of Defense's November 2006 report to Congress, "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," programs for national reconciliation and disarmament are difficult to design and implement due to the presence of numerous illegal armed groups, whose personal loyalties to sub-national groups, such as tribe, sect or political party, are often stronger than loyalty to Iraq as a nation-state and condone or maintain support for violent means as a source of political leverage.

Up until now the United States and NATO have largely fought the Taliban insurgency from the outside in, rather than from the inside out. That is, to become insurgents inside the insurgency, controlling events rather than reacting to them. We need to disconnect the dots, to disrupt the various insurgent networks, sow confusion and disorder among them and isolate them from the people. Sometimes doing nothing about locally generated animosities or even leveraging them may be part of that equation.

The Pashtuns remain the center of gravity in Afghanistan. The same cultural fault lines that have worked against us up until now could again work in our favor as they did 2001. We need to appreciate better the Pashtunwali or "the way of the Pashtun" and focus our efforts selectively and from the bottom up.

Nothing is possible, however, if we don't understand "why" we are in Afghanistan. The "how" of it is a different matter.

(Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D., is a colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve and a veteran of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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