"Russia is to weapons-usable material what Saudi Arabia is to oil," Paul Longsworth, deputy administrator at the National Nuclear Security Administration, an organization in the U.S. energy department, said Tuesday.

Longsworth estimated that Russia has 600 metric tons of nuclear material - the bulk of the world's share of weapons-grade materials and enough to make 10,000 crude nuclear weapons. And Russia's three plutonium-producing reactors produce 1.2 metric tons of plutonium annually - enough for about two nuclear weapons a week, said Longsworth.

By itself, the uranium from Soviet weapons provides the United States with half of its uranium needs, Longsworth said. If uranium makes up 20 percent of the energy mix used in the United States, he said, that means one-in-10 of the 72 lights in the hearing room is running off of old uranium supplied by Russia.

The United States is helping Russia to convert the reactors to coal-burning facilities. And so far 75 percent of the sites where the 600 metric tons of nuclear materials are stored have been secured.

But the remaining sites, holding about half of the material, have not yet been secured. The deadline for the remaining sites is 2008. However, these sites are the most sensitive for the Russians because nuclear weapons are being produced in some of them, Longsworth said.

No outside authorities have been given access to the sites, but officials need to get into the sites, or at least secure them - or verify that they are secure, Longsworth said.

Still, no authoritative count exists for the global supply of nuclear weapons and materials. Not having an inventory of the global supply of nuclear weapons and materials worried nuclear expert Joan Rohlfing, also spoke at the hearing.

Nuclear experts use Russia as a baseline because it probably has the largest share of weapons and materials of any one country. But focusing on Russia misses the point, said Rohlfing, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington nuclear watchdog, in an interview.

Countries and regions like Pakistan, the Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe have smaller amounts of nuclear materials, but that are more vulnerable. A bomb requires only a small amount of uranium or plutonium; terrorists don't need to go to Russia for it, Rohlfing said.

Rohlfing also said the U.S. agencies leading the efforts lack adequate money, tools and authority to do their job.

The agencies tasked with eliminating proliferation threats are "crawling" instead of racing to secure the global supply of nuclear materials, she said. The agencies are focusing on only a fraction of the materials out there, she said, adding that total security has not been given the priority it should be, given the consequences of a nuclear attack.

Although Longsworth told lawmakers his program is adequately funded for its present goals, more money means recovering more sources.

On the other hand, diplomacy is one of the greatest obstacles to U.S. efforts to get back or convert high-risk materials, Longsworth said.

The NNSA deals with sovereign countries that must agree to U.S. demands. Some, such as Iran, are not on good terms or do not want to work with the United States.

Others are worried that eliminating the nuclear fuel used for non-military purposes, such as medical research, will disrupt research programs or will be too costly. So far 40 countries have agreed to return about 20 metric tons of material, according to Longsworth.

Incentives used to encourage such nations usually involve funding, which drives up costs and slows the process down, he said.

The issue of securing materials that can be used to make a "dirty bomb" or a nuclear weapon became a top priority after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

The NNSA tries to eliminate proliferation threats by stopping the production of nuclear materials and eliminate existing stocks of them. Highly enriched uranium - uranium that has undergone a process of extracting a highly volatile element - and plutonium are the two materials used for nuclear weapons.

Highly enriched uranium can be used for generating energy as well as for weapons. Plutonium, a byproduct of the enriching process, is easier to make and cheaper than uranium.

A crude nuclear weapon requires about 90 pounds of highly enriched uranium. That is equivalent to a two-liter bottle of soda, said Charles Ferguson of the Council on Foreign Relations, a New York-based think tank. But a country with proper facilities could make more bombs with the same amount.

Much of the material reached countries with nuclear programs as a result of policies begun during the Eisenhower administration's "Atoms for Peace" program.

President Dwight Eisenhower proposed using atomic technology for energy instead of weapons with the idea that if nations used it for producing energy they would no longer use it for military purposes. The former Soviet Union was also a major source of nuclear fuel.

Between the United States and Russia, 230 pounds of highly enriched uranium has been recovered and sent back to its country of origin.

In the meantime, the United States is still working to get back about 26,400 pounds of highly enriched uranium supplied by the United States to countries around the world, said Longsworth, although much of it is in countries like France or Britain that pose less of a security risk.

"If terrorists were to get access to plutonium or HEU, they would have overcome a significant step in the pathway to a full weapon," Longsworth said.

But, so far U.S. energy officials need greater legal authority to demand return of the materials, he said.

However, at the same time, recent legislation allows for the United States to ship highly enriched uranium to countries using it to produce materials used in medical research - mainly Canada and the Netherlands, according to Ferguson.

The allowance is made if the cost of converting their facilities to run on low enriched uranium (which cannot be used for nuclear weapons) is 10 percent higher than the cost of running the facility, Ferguson said.

Although these countries pose little threat the United States, it is a matter of "principle," Ferguson said. The United States must take the "next step to completely delegitimize" use of materials than can be used for weapons, he said.

Related Links
SpaceDaily
Search SpaceDaily
Subscribe To SpaceDaily Express