At least nominally, this is twice the number of forces involved in the last major effort to take control of Baghdad, Operation Lightning, which was conducted in May 2005.

It is far too soon to make any judgments about this operation. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has said that the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior will provide more details, but even when they do, sheer prudence indicates that such briefings will not disclose many details about the size of the forces engaged, their goals, the duration of the operation, and how they will proceed.

Accordingly, there are several points that observers of this operation need to consider:

-- Prior operations and the changing security problem: The operation comes after a major sweep of al-Qaida and insurgent cells in Baghdad and the country. It builds on previous success. At the same time, the "red" or dangerous areas in Baghdad have crept back to at least the size they were in early 2005. Senior Iraqi officials make it clear that they also see the threat as both insurgent and a mix of militias and local security forces.

One Iraqi official said that from his perspective, Sadr's actions in Baghdad, Basra, and elsewhere -- and the ability to split or push the Shiite coalition to extremes -- made him and his militia as much of a threat as the insurgents. Hyperbole? Yes. But, a major issue.

-- The problem of force ratios: Iraqi officials discuss Baghdad as having 20-33 percent of Iraq's population. Estimates of 6 million people are common, although it is unclear any real estimate exists beyond the data gathered for voting registrations and the United Nations' food for peace program. Much depends as well on whether the core city, the entire province, or associated areas in greater Baghdad are counted. Regardless of the numbers, even 80,000 men would be a small force in terms of the total population and area to be covered. Moreover, only part of any such force can be deployed. No matter how many people are publicly announced as being involved in the operation, such totals inevitably include large numbers of support forces, headquarters units, etc.

Accordingly, for an operation to have real meaning, and produce sustainable results, it has to go far beyond manning check points, establishing a visible presence, and creating the image of security. These are politically important, but they also will be hollow if they are the core of the operations. Insurgents and militias can simply wait out the operations, bury their arms, shift to targets in other areas, and operate around and outside the checkpoints and areas where forces are present.

-- What does matter -- Focused operations: This does not mean this operation cannot have great impact, but the real impact will consist of active operations in the "red" or high threat areas that directly attack insurgent targets on which there is good intelligence, and efforts to disarm, disperse, or directly control the militias. Given the political nature of this struggle, Iraqi and Coalition sources should stress Iraqi successes, Iraqi tips and human intelligence or HUMINT, and Iraqi control and planning.

Such claims will often be correct, but Iraq does not yet have anything like the intelligence and command and control capabilities to conduct such an operation on its own. It still needs a U.S. partner, although this partner should be as silent about its intelligence and special operations role as possible (and media should be extremely discreet) and minimize its importance in operations.

-- Credibility and restraint: The public side of the operation needs to do as much as possible to restore Iraqi faith in U.S. operations, the MOI forces, and the police. The scandals -- real and imagined -- of the past months, make it critical that Iraqi civilians are not injured or killed, collateral damage is minimal, and armed action be clearly directed at real insurgent targets.

First of two parts

(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. This article is extracted from his new CSIS paper "Securing Baghdad: Understanding and Covering the Operation.")

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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