Moscow and Washington have longstanding disagreements over the arms-reduction methodology.

The excruciating details and negotiating tactics of the Cold War era are back, as the two sides do not trust each other. Russia insists on counting and capping the two sides' nuclear warheads and strategic missiles. It wants to include missiles that had been mothballed or converted to conventional missions, in order to limit the Pentagon's capability to "upload" -- restore to service -- or transform conventional delivery systems back to nuclear ones.

This is an important issue, since Russia dismantles all its missiles that fall under the weapons reduction treaty. Storage and maintenance are costly, and many Russian missile systems are obsolete.

U.S. President Barack Obama has not clarified whether 1,000 remaining warheads would include the total number of warheads or only those operationally deployed.

Russian defense experts note that Russia will have to remove many of its older intercontinental ballistic missiles -- ICBMs -- such as RS-18 (NATO designation SS-19 Stiletto) and RS-20 (NATO designation SS-18 Satan) from operational service in the coming years. Their life spans already have been extended numerous times.

Additionally, the missiles' manufacturer in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine, has refused to provide their maintenance. Military experts do not view replacement of these missiles with Topol (NATO designation SS-25 Sickle) as a viable option in the short run, because their production is slow. Topol is currently capable of carrying one warhead of maximum 1 ton -- 1.2 tons for Topol-M -- compared with 4.3 tons for the RS-18 and 8.8 tons for the RS-20.

From 2000-2008, Russia reportedly has produced some 27 Topol-M (NATO designation SS-27) ballistic missiles that are capable of carrying multiple individually targeted re-entry vehicles -- MIRVs -- and no cruise missiles. A slow production rate may preclude Russia from agreeing to a fast timetable of missile cuts.

Many Russian military experts believe that ballistic nuclear missiles remain the most cost-effective option for Moscow's deterrence. Russia may be vulnerable in case of massive conventional warfare, in which Russia is falling behind the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization and possibly China.

Stepping up conventional military capabilities to replace nuclear arms cuts, as the United States may do, would be unaffordable for the Russian economy, which is reeling from the current global economic crisis.

The ruble has plummeted against the dollar by more than 50 percent in five months, and the Russian stock market has dropped by 80 percent from its peak in May 2008. This is bad news for the Russian Ministry of Defense on Arbatskaya Square in Moscow: The $300 billion modernization package over five years, promised to the Russian brass by the Putin-Medvedev administration in 2008, may be severely cut. Thus, Russia's expiring missile stockpiles and plummeting budgets make the Obama proposal beneficial for Moscow.

Negotiations with Washington would enable the Kremlin to score some points over downsizing the nuclear systems such as the Satan and Stiletto, which Russia would shortly have to remove from service because of obsolescence. But producing modern replacement systems would be lingering and costly, as the multiple failures of the submarine-launched Bulava system have demonstrated.

Critics say Obama's strong commitment to cutting the nuclear forces suggests that his resolve in using them under any circumstances is weak. The challenge is to enact the cut without compromising U.S. security and geopolitical power in a world where the force, not the rules, still rules.

Idealists on the Obama team may like to see a nuclear-free world. However, in practice, "rogue states" are pursuing nuclear programs: North Korea is preparing for the long-range ballistic missile test, while Iran recently launched its first satellite -- a precursor to a full-fledged ICBM program.

Therefore, it is crucial that Washington maintains a strong nuclear deterrent and treads carefully when playing nuclear poker with the Russian bear.

-- (Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian studies and international energy security at the Catherine and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation.)

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