A former Afghan minister, speaking privately, said, "They spend over half their time coordinating among themselves... The Afghan tango is now known as one step forward, and three steps backward."

The Shiite suburbs of Kabul are now under the control of Iranian or pro-Iranian agents. The capital city has mushroomed from 400,000 at the time of 9/11 to 2 million today. Some 500,000 acres of public land was seized and sold for the benefit of the entrenched bureaucracy.

To control this vast country of 30 million would require several hundred thousand troops. The U.S. and allied-trained Afghan army numbers 20,000 instead of the 35,000 projected by now.

The consensus forged in the heady days of liberation in December 2001 is broken. Fear of the B-52 bombers is gone. And today's Afghanistan is totally insecure, so much so that it has already been promoted to the ranks of failed states -- except for an all-pervasive opium culture that keeps Afghanistan from sinking into total chaos.

The illicit opium poppy industry is, according to a former minister in President Hamid Karzai's government, "a pyramid structure. If ever there were a management prize for the perfect supply chain," it would go to what generates from one half to two-thirds of Afghan GDP. He said there are "25 mafia dons at the top of the pyramid who control the key power levers. The Interior Ministry is owned by the drug industry."

In Helmand province (40% of the country's opium production), Taliban fighters protect poppy farmers from eradication efforts, and extract millions of dollars for their services.

Managing relationships with the United States, NATO, the European Union, Iran, India and Pakistan, Russia and China is beyond the capabilities of the Karzai government. The game of nations is played below the president's radar screen. The U.S. is hoping to diversify Afghanistan's regional relationships by coaxing Gulf states to become stakeholders; but the "Gulfies" are otherwise engaged by the uncertainties of the Iraq war and Iran's nuclear ambitions.

An estimated $8 billion a year is needed to dig Afghanistan out of its narco-state status. But the funds aren't available. And only an estimated 20 cents on the dollar is used for what it was intended. Afghans cannot be bought, said another ex-minister (not for attribution), "but they can be rented." And much rental money has been dispensed in the three Afghan provinces that share borders with Iran -- by Iranian agents. Clandestine U.S. "recon" operations are also run from these provinces -- into Iran.

Russia complains about being left out of Afghan affairs, which is hardly surprising. The Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan throughout the 1990s and killed thousands of Afghans in a vain attempt to establish its dominion. But Moscow says it still has many friends in the former anti-Taliban Northern Alliance that resisted Talibanization in the northeastern part of the country, and which liberated large parts of the country when the U.S. launched the invasion in October 2001.

Many NGOs provide and perform services neglected by government-to-government aid. But it's highly dangerous work. Volunteers from all over the world have been killed and injured by Taliban guerrillas and pro-Taliban civilians. Most of them now remain in major cities and pay local staffs for fieldwork.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies' most recent report on the state of Afghanistan was based on 1,000 "structured" conversations in half of the country's 34 provinces, 13 surveys, polls and focus groups; 200 expert interviews; and the daily monitoring of 70 media sources and 182 organizations. Principal findings are:

1. Afghans are losing trust in their government due to escalation in violence;

2. Public expectations are neither being met nor managed;

3. Conditions have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for development.

Afghans are more insecure than two years ago; insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns spawn ever more violence. Security forces are unable to combat warlords and drug lords, frequently one and the same. State security institutions are plagued with corruption and retention problems as rank-and-filers switch sides for better pay. Local mafias and their militia frequently overwhelm local governance entities set up by the Karzai government. Democratic judicial structures are also stillborn, stifled by criminal networks and bribes, or camouflaged to practice sharia (Islamic) law.

The overall situation is infinitely more complex today than when Afghanistan was liberated in 2001. Staying the course is meaningless in today's Afghanistan, which requires massive infusions of foreign aid and a multi-year commitment that would require NATO troops and billions in aid for many years to come.

The uniqueness of Afghanistan's predicament was highlighted by one of CSIS' recommendations: Shift 50 percent of the development budget to the 34 provinces and distribute direct assistance through the hawala system. Hawala is the centuries-old way of bypassing banking circuits by using word-of-mouth between two parties that trust each other.

Transnational terrorists, Taliban and drug lords have been using hawala since long before western security agencies took an interest in the system's inner workings. And it wouldn't take long to co-opt or silence government hawala circuits.

CSIS also says restoring progress in Afghanistan requires dramatic changes. The Afghan army is not truly national; the desertion rate rises when soldiers are dispatched too far from home base. And NATO member parliaments anxiously debate where and how NATO commanders in Afghanistan can utilize their troops. Mighty Germany won't let its Afghan contingent do any fighting.

Only the United States, British, Canadian and Dutch troops are authorized to search and destroy. The U.S. is boosting its troops by 3,200 to 27,000, the highest level of the war. Meanwhile, Taliban's much-touted spring offensive is only days away.

Pakistan and Afghanistan should be a single theater of operations as Taliban enjoy privileged sanctuaries in the tribal areas on the Pak side of a mythical frontier. But NATO and U.S. troops cannot chase Taliban fighters back into Pakistan without triggering a chain reaction that could easily lead to the fall of President Pervez Musharraf -- and the control of the country's nuclear arsenal passing into unknown military hands and their anti-American, pro-Taliban political allies.

earlier related report
Big Power Backlash Could Impact Afghan Plans
by Richard May - UPI Outside View Commentator Washington (UPI) March 14 - Britain has announced that it would be pulling 1,600 troops out of Iraq and the Dutch have said that they will follow suit. This presents a sharp blow to the Bush administration and its efforts in the war in Iraq.

The move signals that Europe is growing tired of American adventurism in the Middle East. Britain and the Netherlands, who are following the British lead, are not the only European countries that have grown weary of the United States presence in Iraq, but most countries don't have troops that they can withdraw to show their displeasure. Instead, the European countries that lack troops in Iraq may illustrate their dislike for the United States in another place: Afghanistan.

The coalition government of Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi has fallen apart because of a disagreement over foreign policy in Afghanistan. The Italian Left was unwilling to extend the deployment of 1,900 Italian soldiers in Afghanistan. Prodi tried to force the issue by taking it to a vote, which subsequently led to the coalition's demise and forced his resignation. What the United States should be worried about, however, is not this singular setback, but the fact that this might be a harbinger of future impediments to come.

In December 2006, France said that it would pull its 200-soldier Special Forces unit out of Afghanistan. The Dutch have said that they will not stay beyond the summer of 2008. Even America's continental neighbor Canada has said that it will not extend its troops beyond its commitment of 2009.

Germany, much like many European countries, has repeatedly refused to use its troops in any way besides training Afghani forces, International Security Assistance Force operations in the north and reconstruction operations. Are these refusals a lack of interest in Afghanistan, a loss of faith in America's ability to succeed, or a representation of Europe's growing frustration with the United States?

The United States has been very vocal about NATO members stepping up and providing support to Afghanistan, but it has seen little response. While the United States has committed $10.6 billion to Afghanistan reconstruction efforts, Europe has pledged significantly less, about $777 million over four years. This European aid is intended for strengthening institutions and the rule of law. While these are much needed funds, they are a small amount compared to the U.S. contribution.

When looking at the limitations of European troop missions and economic support together, it becomes clear that the European continent is slowly pulling back from Afghanistan. Thus, the collapse of the Prodi coalition may be the first, of many, setbacks for Afghanistan in Europe.

But why is there this backlash? Europe sees the United States as an expansionist force that is trying to clumsily extend its reach around the world. While most European nations did not agree with the initial invasion of Iraq, now they have simply has lost trust that the United States can be successful.

Moreover, Europe has to deal with the possibility that the extremists in Iraq might come to their countries. Many European nations, including France, Britain and Germany, have large Muslim populations and the possibility for extremist elements to bring the training that they learn in Iraq to European doorsteps is greater than bringing it to the United States.

Another problem is that Europeans are increasingly seeing Iraq and Afghanistan as one issue. Afghanistan was originally viewed as a U.N.-mandated, NATO-supported mission. As the United States continues its combat operations in support of the "global war on terror" in the south of Afghanistan, it looks too much like the combat operations in Iraq. As Iraq fails and as the Taliban resurges, too many Europeans are drawing parallels between Afghanistan and Iraq.

The U.S. administration has no one to blame but themselves; by developing the catchphrase of the "global war on terror" they have muddled opinions of different operations into one singular endeavor. Originally, the United States developed the phrase so that people would associate Iraq with the initial successes in Afghanistan; now that has backfired and people associate the failures of Iraq with Afghanistan.

To illustrate this point, Massismo D'Alema, the current Italian foreign minister and former prime minister, said while debating the Italian troop extension, "There is a profound difference between the military operations in Afghanistan, approved by the United Nations, and those in Iraq."

Unfortunately, the Italian Parliament did not see this distinction and promptly denied the extension. Subsequently, the Italian government collapsed. While this sad event happened in Italy, it is easy to see similar feelings throughout Europe. The distinction between Iraq and Afghanistan is fading in European minds, and as the Taliban becomes stronger the desire for Europeans to withdraw from another perceived American quagmire will only increase.

(Richard May is a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the World Security Institute's Center for Defense Information. He served as an officer in the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

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