This position not only prevented Russia from storing spent fuel from America, but also from the many other countries to which the U.S. supplies nuclear material.

In early July, however, the Bush administration changed course and signaled its willingness to allow spent nuclear fuel under American jurisdiction to be stored in Russia even though Moscow has not stopped providing assistance to the Iranian atomic energy reactor program. But it has been widely reported that since Washington allowed it to store spent fuel that might be worth up to $20 billion to Moscow, the Bush administration hopes the Kremlin will become more amenable to cooperation with Washington on both Iran and North Korea.

Why such an agreement would be appealing to both Washington and Moscow, if not to environmentalists or the Russian public, is understandable. American expectations that it will lead to Moscow supporting a hard-line U.S. stance on Iran, North Korea, or anything else, however, are unrealistic. That is because even though both governments support this deal, they are likely to view its implications differently.

In Washington, the reversal of American opposition to Russia storing spent fuel under U.S. jurisdiction is seen as providing a financial windfall to Moscow which the Kremlin will value and be grateful for. Washington, then, should be able to use both the prospect of signing this agreement as well as the possibility of terminating it after it is signed as leverage for aligning Russia's policies toward Iran and North Korea with its own.

In Moscow, however, this agreement is likely to be seen very differently. The Kremlin knows storing nuclear waste in their own countries is unpopular with the public in the United States and other countries. The Putin administration's willingness to store it in Russia, is therefore seen in Moscow as providing a significant benefit for which Russia deserves to be well paid. Furthermore, because America and the West benefit so much from Russia storing their nuclear waste, Moscow can hardly be expected to alter its policies toward Iran and North Korea. Given its past behavior, Moscow will undoubtedly see no reason why it cannot make money from the West for storing its spent fuel as well as from Iran for aiding its atomic energy program.

If Washington and Moscow do indeed sign this agreement but have very different expectations about what it will lead to, the improvement in relations that both sides want is likely to be short-lived when the expectations of one or both go unfulfilled.

This is what happened in the 1970's when Washington and Moscow signed agreements on strategic arms limitation. Both saw these as beneficial, but Washington thought they would also lead to reduced Soviet-American competition in the Third World. Moscow, by contrast, had no such expectation. After Moscow and its allies became militarily involved in several Third World conflicts culminating in the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Washington felt betrayed and called a halt to progress on arms control.

Moscow, for its part, saw nuclear arms control as benefiting both sides equally no matter what happened in the Third World. In their view, Washington's halting the nuclear arms control process after Afghanistan was irrational. The result was that the hopes for d�tente of the 1970's gave way to a renewed Cold War in the 1980's.

Hopes for improved Russian-American relations could again give way to heightened suspicion if Moscow and Washington sign a nuclear cooperation accord but have conflicting expectations about whether it should lead to Moscow adopting Washington's stance toward Iran and North Korea. In order to avoid this, the two sides need to reach a common understanding about how this proposed accord will affect their policies toward Tehran and Pyongyang, or whether it will have any impact on them at all.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.

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