The campaigns now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan are so-called fourth generation wars: a modern form of insurgency which seeks to convince the enemy's political leaders that their strategic goals are either unreachable or too costly for the perceived benefit.

Such fourth generation wars are based on the idea that superior political will can defeat greater economic and military power.

"These modern insurgencies are the only type of war that the United States has lost, in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia," argues Colonel Thomas X. Hammes in a paper for the Institute for National Strategic Studies where he is a senior fellow.

"They can be overcome - witness Malaya (1950s), Oman (1970s), and El Salvador (1980s). Winning, however, requires coherent, patient action that encompasses the full range of political, economic, social, and military activities.

The United States cannot force its opponents to fight the short, high-technology wars it easily dominates. Instead, the Nation must learn to fight fourth-generation wars anew," Hammes adds.

Military strategists use the term fourth generation to describe the dynamics and future direction of warfare.

They claim that the first generation of modern war took place between nation states, was dominated by massed manpower, and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. Firepower characterized the second generation, which culminated in World War I.

The third generation was dominated by maneuver and blitzkrieg as developed by the Germans in World War II.

The fourth generation has evolved in ways that exploit the political, social, economic, and technical changes since World War II in such a way that militarily weaker forces can defeat a stronger enemy by unconventional or asymmetric tactics - which means not fighting the kind of the war the U.S. Army is trained to win.

The strategic thinking now under way in the military think tanks like the National Defense University and Fort Leavenworth relates precisely to the kind of policy clashes now under way at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, where the Iraq theater commander General John Abizaid last week refused to endorse Vice President Dick Cheney's view that the Iraqi insurgency was "in its last throes."

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld came under attack from Republican as well as Democratic Senators on the Armed Services Committee last week, who warned him that opinion was turning against the war even in conservative and pro-military states like South Carolina. This is precisely the kind of political 'victory' insurgents seek.

"Fourth-generation warfare attempts to change the minds of enemy policymakers directly," writes Colonel Hammes.

"But this change is not to be achieved through the traditional 1st-3rd generation objective of destroying the enemy's armed forces and the capacity to regenerate them.

"Both the epic, decisive battles of the Napoleonic era and the wide-ranging, high-speed maneuver campaigns of the 20th century are irrelevant to this new warfare. More relevant is the way in which specific messages are targeted toward policymakers and those who can influence them.

"Although tailored for various audiences, each message is designed to achieve the basic purpose of war: to change an opponent's political position on a matter of national interest."

"The struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan show these characteristics. In each, the insurgents are sending one message to their supporters, another to the undecided population, and a third to the coalition decision-makers.

"Supporters are told that they are defending the faith and their country against outside invaders. The message to uncommitted or pro-coalition countrymen is to stay out of the fight between the insurgents and the invaders, who will eventually leave.

"Finally, the coalition, particularly the Americans, is advised to withdraw or be engaged in an endless, costly fight," Hammes adds.

"The media will remain a major factor from the strategic to the tactical level. In fact, worldwide media exposure can quickly give a tactical action strategic impact," Hammes writes, citing the impact of TV images on CNN of downed U.S. helicopter crews in Somalia, and the subsequent decision by the Clinton administration to withdraw U.S. forces.

"Such an opponent does not need a large command and control system," Hammes adds.

"At a time when U.S forces are pouring more money and manpower into command and control, commercial technology makes worldwide, secure communications available to anyone with a laptop and a credit card.

"It also provides access to 1-meter-resolution satellite imagery, extensive information on U.S. troop movements, immediate updates on national debates, and international discussion forums.

"Finally, it provides a worldwide financial network that is fairly secure. In fact, with the proliferation of Internet cafes, one needs neither the credit card nor the laptop - only an understanding of how email and a browser work and some basic human intelligence tradecraft."

Fourth-generation warfare timelines, organizations, and objectives are very different from those of conventional war, argues Hammes. Timelines are much longer.

"For the United States, a long war is 5 years - which, in fact, was the duration of major U.S. involvement in Vietnam (1965-1970). The Nation entered when the war was already under way and left before it was over. Even then, the U.S. public thought the country had been at war too long.

"But fourth generation wars are long. The Chinese Communists fought for 28 years; the Vietnamese Communists for 30; the Sandinistas for 18. The Palestinians have been resisting Israeli occupation for 37 years so far - and some would argue they have been fighting since 1948.

"The Chechens have been fighting over 10 years - this time. Al-Qaeda has been fighting for their vision of the world for 20 years since the founding of Maktab al-Khidamar in 1984."

The question now is whether the U.S. military thinkers who are working out the principles of this new form of warfare will be able to convey to U.S. politicians and public the hard lesson they are drawing: that the real battle ground of the future will be the longevity of America's political will.

"Fourth-generation opponents do not seek the defeat of the enemy forces," Hammes emphasizes. "They seek the erosion of the enemy's political will and can win even if the opposing military force is largely intact. They focus on winning wars, not battles."

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